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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

TROY MICHAEL KELL,
Appellant/Petitioner,
:

Case No. 20070234

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Kell appeals from an order and judgment denying post-conviction relief from his
aggravated murder conviction and resulting death sentence. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (West 2004).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. The jury saw a videotape of Kell stabbing Lonnie Blackmon sixty-seven times,
including in the eyes. It heard about Kell's extensive history of violence and threats of
violence while incarcerated. It knew that Kell murdered Blackmon while serving a lifewithout-parole sentence. Was there any reasonable likelihood that anything counsel could
have done Kell may have resulted in a conviction of something less than capital murder or
-1-

sentence less than death?
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly deny post-conviction relief on claims that
Kell raised and lost on direct appeal?
3. Did the post-conviction court correctly deny post-conviction relief on Kell's claims
that his counsel should have challenged the death-qualification process or the trial court's
reasonable doubt definition?
4. On direct appeal, this Court rejected Kell's claim that it should reverse Kell's
conviction and sentence because he was tried in the prison courtroom. Kell lost. Did the
post-conviction court correctly deny post-conviction relief on Kell's claim that his trial
counsel should have sought interlocutory review on that issue?
5. Did the post-conviction court correctly assign the summary judgment burdens
between Kell and the State and correctly grant summary judgment on Kell's ineffectiveassistance claims?
Because the post-conviction court disposed of Kell's petition on summary judgment,
this Court reviews the judgment against Kell for correctness, viewing the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Kell. See, e.g., Dowling v. Bullen, 2004
UT 50^7, 94 P.3d 915.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-104 through 106, and Utah R. Civ. P. 65C
are in addendum A.

-2-

CASE STATEMENT1
The murder
Kell committed his first murder in Nevada. A Nevada jury sentenced Kell to life
without the possibility of parole. (X5051,5132; XIII5625-26.)
In June 1993, Nevada transferred Kell to the Utah State Prison (VII4588; X5074).
On May 21, 1994, two fights broke out: one between white inmate John Cannistraci and
black inmate Mounir Nafka, and a second between white inmate Paul Payne, Cannistraci's
friend, and black inmate Lonnie Blackmon, Nafka's cellmate. (VIII4777, 4814-16, 4787,
4822.)
After guards stopped the second fight with a fire hose, one ordered Blackmon and
Payne to shake hands. They obeyed. However, Blackmon "sucker punched" Payne from
behind as Payne returned to his cell. Payne ran upstairs to Kell's cell, picked up a shank, and
ran back downstairs. By then Blackmon had been locked back into his cell. (VIII4817-19,
4823-24.)
On July 5,1994, Kell and his accomplices, Eric Daniels and Payne, submitted medical
request slips to visit the infirmary. Daniels also forged a slip to transport Blackmon to the

]

The record from the underlying criminal case contains 12 pleadings files
paginated chronologically. The State refers to the criminal pleadings file as "KIR" (KI
for Kell I). There are approximately 47 transcript volumes in the criminal file. The
district court clerk assigned individual record numbers to all the transcript pages, but they
are not numbered chronologically. The State refers to the criminal-case pretrial
transcripts as "T." The State refers to the criminal trial transcripts by their Roman
numeral, e.g., "1X4882." Citations to the post-conviction record will be to "KIIR."
-3-

infirmary. State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106 If 3, 61 P.3d 1019.
During the transport, Kell, who had made a handcuff key out of plastic kitchen
utensils, removed his handcuffs. Kell stabbed Blackmon, who was still in handcuffs, in the
chest, back, neck, face, and eyes. Daniels and Payne restrained Blackmon during the attack.
Kell returned to resume the attack after twice walking away. Id. atfflf5-6. After killing
Blackmon, Kell strutted around the room, yelling "White Power" and "[I've] been killin'
niggers ever since [I] was an itty-bitty Aryan." (VII4720-22; XI5307-08; State's criminal
Exhibit 3.)
The medical examiner, Dr. Maureen Frikke, counted sixty-seven stab wounds,
including twenty-six on the face and chin, twenty-seven on the neck, and nine to Blackmon's
eyes.2 Dr. Frikke believed that a stab wound under the right ear that severed Blackmon's
carotid artery caused Blackmon's death. (1X4870, 4874, 4877, 4880-89.)
A video tape captured the entire murder. Kell, 2002 UT 106 \ 29.
The criminal trial and direct appeal.
The State charged Kell with capital murder. After holding two evidentiary hearings,
the trial court determined to hold the trial at the Central Utah Correctional Facility courtroom
to address security concerns particular to Kell. Id. at \ 7.
At trial, Kell testified that he killed Blackmon because he believed that statements he

2

Kell cut through Blackmon's eyelids to the bone, perforated the left eyeball, and
cut through the nasal bone into the nasal cavity.
-4-

overheard from Blackmon were a threat directed at him even though Blackmon made no
threatening gestures toward Kell. Id. at % 8-9.3
After hearing evidence and viewing the videotape, the jury convicted Kell of capital
murder. Id. atffif9, 29-31.
At the penalty hearing, the State introduced evidence of Kell's extensive history of
violence and threats of violence while incarcerated in both Nevada and Utah. For example,
while incarcerated in Nevada, Kell offered to pay a new female guard to smuggle an ounce
of marijuana into the prison. The guard reported Kell's request to her supervisors. Kell then
told her that "he was gonna cut [her] throat" and "popped open his food slot" "to let [her]
know that he could get to [her] when he wanted to." Kell warned that "he [had] a lot of
inmates on the yard who [would] kill [her]." Kell also warned that "he had a life sentence,
so it didn't matter that he was gonna cut [her] head off." (XIII5515-22.)
Another Nevada guard testified that Kell threw a hot liquid substance at him through
his food slot, causing first degree burns on the guard's thigh, abdomen, and groin. He
testified that Kell beat another inmate about the face and throat, and that Kell stopped the
beating only after a guard chambered a round into his shotgun and ordered Kell to the
ground. (XIII5531-33.)
Yet another Nevada guard testified that Kell and another white inmate assaulted a

3

The trial court declined Kell's request for an imperfect self-defense manslaughter
instruction, but granted Kell's request for an extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter
instruction. Id.
-5-

black inmate by kicking and punching him. Kell continued the assault even after the guard
issued a verbal warning and fired a warning shot. Kell stopped only after the guard shot him
in the legs. (XIII5575-76.)
Kell at least twice threatened to harm a Utah prison guard who had searched his cell.
On the second occasion, Kell smashed his elbow against the glass in his cell door and yelled,
"I'll get you with my elbow. I've taken out guys before. I'll waste you. I'll get you."
(XIII5551-53, 5555-56.)
Another CUCF guard told how a cuffed, belted, and shackled Kell jumped in the air
and, for no apparent reason, struck another inmate in the chin with his elbow, knocking the
other inmate to the ground (XIII5601-03).
Another CUCF guard testified that Kell repeatedly struck an inmate while a third
inmate held the victim's arms, inflicting severe bruising to both temples, the left cheek, upper
lip, nose, and left eye, and causing the inmate's middle left finger and elbow to swell.
(XIII5580-82.)
Kell also head-butted a CUCF guard, striking him in the face, lower nose, and upper
lip, causing a nose bleed and a raw lip (XIII5592).
Officers searching Kell's cell often found contraband, demonstrating that Kell posed
a security risk. For example, guards found a document entitled "Reconnaissance 88," which
contained several references to the Utah Corrections SWAT team, their scheduled
movements, the number of SWAT team members on duty at any given time, and the gear and

-6-

weapons used that the team used. (XIII5551, 5558, 5607-08, 5619.)
In another search, guards discovered that Kell had removed the silicone caulking from
his window. This would have made it possible for Kell to remove the window, making it
easier to attack guards or providing Kell with material to make a weapon. (XIII5609.)
The State also presented evidence of Kell's first murder. Kell shot James Kelly six
times in the face at close range. (XIII5626-27; State's criminal Exhibit 47).
Larry Blackmon, the victim's brother, read a short statement on behalf of the
Blackmon family. (XIII5630-32.)
Kell called Sandy Shaw, his accomplice in the Kelly murder. Shaw testified that she
grew up next door to Kell and viewed him as an older brother. She testified that she asked
Kell to beat up Kelly because, when Shaw was fifteen, Kelly had been harassing her and
asked her to let him photograph her nude. (XIV5641-5647.)
Kell, Shaw, and another man lured Kelly into the desert, where Kell murdered him.
(XIV5646-52.) Shaw claimed that they had not planned to shoot Kelly. However, she
acknowledged that, after the murder, they divided up the $ 1000 dollars in Kelly's wallet and
drove off in Kelly's car with Kell at the wheel. She also agreed that Kell did not seem upset
that he had just killed someone. (XIV5653-54.)
Kell also presented videotaped depositions of two Nevada inmates. Both testified that
Kell was not a racist, only a separatist, and that prisoners under life-without-parole sentences
have few options. They explained that threats from other prisoners had to be taken seriously,

-7-

that the prison code prohibits going to guards to resolve problems with other inmates, and
that Kell had no choice but to kill Blackmon before Blackmon killed him. (XIV5655-56;
T5931:3-5, 10-12, 14-17, 19; T5964:3-4, 11-13.)
Kell's mother testified that he had always been "strong willed," but that he had been
a "cheerful happy kid." Kell's parents divorced when he was seven, and Kell had a difficult
time accepting the divorce. Kell, who loved both parents, was allowed open visitation with
both. Both parents and Kell's stepfather loved him, despite some trouble he caused when
growing up. (XIV5666-69.)4
Finally, defense counsel called Vicky Gregory, Ph.D., who testified that Kell's family
was dysfunctional and chaotic, and that his father had physically abused him. Kell, however,
reported to another psychologist that he was offended by and disagreed with this
characterization, and adamantly denied that his parents caused any of his behaviors. (X524445; XI5329-30.)
Kell made an unsworn statement to the jury. He expressed his remorse to Blackmon's
family and offered his own life if that would bring them peace. He cried off and on
throughout the statement. However, after Kell finished, the State called the prison guards
who escorted Kell to court. They testified that, just prior to Kell taking the stand, he told

4

Kell also presented his prison caseworker's notes, reciting that, a few months
before trial, Kell stated 1hat "he felt that he had made a bad mistake at CUCF." The
caseworker also observed that Kell seemed to be "somewhat emotional" and to have
genuine concerns about his future. (XIV5661-62.)
-8-

them, "I'm gonna win an academy award for this one." (XIV5673-79, 5682-84.)
The jury sentenced Kell to death. Kell, 2002 UT 106 f 9.
On direct appeal, Kell's opening and reply briefs spanned 347 pages and raised
numerous claims. This Court rejected them all and affirmed Kell's conviction and sentence.
Kell, 2002 UT 106.
The post-conviction case.
On April 29,2003, the lower court appointed counsel to represent Kell in his the postconviction case (Tr. April 29, 2003 (this transcript does not have a record number). On
August 1, 2005, Kell filed the amended petition for post-conviction relief at issue here
(KIIR252-272, 275-77 (addendum B)). The State moved for and the post-conviction court
granted summary judgment (KIIR290-410, 503-77, 605-631 (addendum C)).
Kell timely filed this appeal (KIIR635-36).
The State recites additional relevant facts and procedural history in the argument
sections to which they apply.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
1. Kell could not have proven prejudice. All of Kell's post-conviction claims
resolved to ineffective-assistance claims. Therefore, Kell would have had to prove that, but
for counsel's alleged errors, there would have been a reasonable probability that the jury
would have acquitted him of capital murder or would have sentenced him to something less
than death. Kell could not have met that burden.

-9-

The jury saw a videotape of Kell stabbing Lonnie Blackmon sixty-seven times. They
saw him twice walk away from Blackmon, then return to inflict more wounds. There was no
substantial question about KelPs guilt.
As to the penalty, the jury saw the brutal attack, which included stab wounds to
Blackmon's eyes. It heard Kell's history of extensive violence and threats of violence while
incarcerated. The jury knew that Kell murdered Blackmon while serving the next lowest
sentence allowed by law. Thus, the jury that had to decide whether to give Kell a sentence
less than death knew that all means to deter Kell's violence short of a death sentence had been
exhausted to no avail. Nothing that Kell's counsel could have done would have saved Kell's
life.
2. Procedurally barred claims. The post-conviction court correctly ruled that five
of Kell's claims were procedurally barred because Kell raised and lost them on direct appeal.
Kell has not demonstrated otherwise. Kell argues that the post-conviction court should have
allowed him to proceed to the claims' merits because 1) he could and did rely on his counsel's
alleged ineffective assistance to avoid the procedural bar; 2) all five claims alleged
constitutional defects in his trial; and 3) Oregon law not available at the time of his direct
appeal would have supported his challenge to trying him in the CUCF courtroom. None of
these arguments demonstrates reversible error.
The ineffective-assistance procedural-bar exception does not apply to previously raised
and lost claims. The relevant subsections of section 106 and this Court's precedent make

-10-

clear that the ineffective-assistance exception applies only to claims that could have been, but
were not raised at trial or on direct appeal.
Even if an ineffective-assistance exception applied, Kell did not make a sufficient
showing of ineffective assistance to avoid the procedural bar. On all but one claim, he
merely concludes without any analysis that he could proceed on the barred claims under an
ineffective-assistance theory. Appellant's Brief at 14. Merely incanting "ineffective
assistance" will not defeat a procedural bar.
As to his claim that counsel ineptly handled the issue of trying him at the CUCF
courtroom, Kell does argue that he "detailed [for the post-conviction court] approximately
four pages worth of efforts that could and should have been made to block the trial being
held at the CUCF." Appellant' Brief at 23. However, in those "approximately four pages
worth of efforts," Kell cited no authority available to his trial and appellate counsel that made
any of those areas of inquiry integral to opposing trial in the CUCF courtroom. Further, Kell
only cited areas of potential investigation. He proffered to the post-conviction court no
evidence of what the investigation, if done, would have revealed.
Kell erroneously cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104 for the proposition that alleging
a constitutional violation defeats the procedural bar. Section 104 lists the kinds of claims that
may justify post-conviction relief, including that the conviction or sentence violates the Utah
or United States constitutions. However, section 104 makes clear that relief under those
claims is available only if the claim is not procedurally barred. Thus, constitutional claims

-11-

are subject to rather than exempt from the procedural bar provision.
Finally, the State agrees that a claim for post-conviction relief based on post-appeal,
retroactive, controlling law will not be procedurally barred: such a claim could not have
raised on direct appeal. However, the post-conviction court did not plainly err by failing to
reassess sua sponte the issue of trying Kell at CUCF based on post-appeal Oregon Supreme
Court authority. The PCRA permits post-conviction relief only for retroactive new rules of
law pronounced by the Unites States Supreme Court, this Court, and the Utah Court of
Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104(2) (West 2004). It does not permit post-conviction
relief for new rules of law pronounced by sister state courts.
3. Ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the death-qualification process
or the trial court's reasonable doubt definitions. The post-conviction court denied relief
on Kell's claim that his appellate counsel should have challenged the death-qualification
process and the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction. That ruling was correct.
Kell's own admission to the post-conviction court defeated his death-qualification
claim. Counsel performs deficiently only when he fails to identify and argue existing law.
Kell admitted that his appellate counsel had no authority available to him that would have
supported a challenge to the death-qualification process.
As to the reasonable doubt definitions, Kell identified for the post-conviction no
defect that he believed appellate counsel should have argued. Kell cited to the postconviction court no authority available to appellate counsel that should have alerted him to

-12-

any unidentified defect or that would have supported an appellate challenge.
For the first time in this appeal, Kell argues that the trial court's 1996 reasonable
doubt definition mirrored one that this Court purportedly found to be "reversible error" in
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. However, Reyes could not have supported his
ineffective-assistance claim. First, Reyes was not available to counsel because this Court
decided it approximately seven years after the trial court instructed the jury and three years
after this Court affirmed Kell's conviction and sentence.

Second, contrary to Keifs

assertion, this Court did not find that the Reyes instruction misdefined reasonable doubt.
Keifs argument that his counsel should have raised these claims because counsel must
raise every possible claim fails under this Court's and the United States Supreme Court's
controlling authority. Similarly, Kell's argument that he has established prejudice because
this Court never heard the claims on direct appeal misstates the prejudice standard. Kell had
to prove that the omitted appellate claims probably would have succeeded, not merely that
this Court never heard the argument.
4. Failure to seek interlocutory review of the order to try Kell at CUCF. Kell
claimed that his trial counsel should have sought interlocutory review of the trial court's
decision to try him in the CUCF courtroom. The post-conviction court rejected the claim;
Kell has not demonstrated that the court erred. First, Kell did not oppose summary judgment
on this claim. Therefore, he waived any appellate argument that the post-conviction court
erroneously granted it.
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Second, the claim clearly failed because Kell could not have establish prejudice.
Appellate counsel challenged the decision to try Kell at the CUCF courtroom on plenary,
post-judgment review. This Court rejected his challenge. If appellate counsel had asked the
Court to review the issue sooner and the Court had granted that request, Kell only would
have lost sooner rather than later.
5. Specific ineffective assistance claims. Kell argues that the post-conviction court
misapplied the summary judgment standard to shift the burden to him. He then proceeds to
argue that the court erroneously granted summary judgment on several of his ineffectiveassistance claims. For the first time on post-conviction appeal, he also argues that all of his
allegations demonstrate per se ineffective assistance.
The post-conviction court correctly assigned to the State and to Kell their respective
burdens under the law governing summary judgment practice. The State met its initial
burden of supporting its factual assertions with evidence by citing to the record in the
underlying criminal case. The burden then shifted to Kell to make his best showing in
support of his ineffective-assistance claims. He had to do so by proffering the evidence on
which he would rely; he could not rest on mere allegations and denials, and he could not
withhold his evidence until the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court correctly recognized and applied those principles.
Further, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that Kell established no material fact
issue and that all of his ineffective-assistance claims failed as a matter of law. Although Kell
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now argues that counsel were per se ineffective, he cites no authority to support that
proposition. Rather, Kell had the burden of proffering sufficient evidence to raise a genuine
material fact issue on both Strickland elements. He failed to do so, relying instead on bare
allegations and denials.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JURY SAW A VIDEOTAPE OF THE MURDER THAT KELL
COMMITTED AND KNEW THAT HE COMMITTED IT WHILE HE
WAS SERVING THE MOST SEVERE SENTENCE SHORT OF
DEATH; KELL HAS NOT AND CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT
ANY ERROR BY COUNSEL PREJUDICED HIM
All of Kell's post-conviction claims resolved to ineffective-assistance claims, at best.5

Therefore, Kell had to prove that, but for counsel's errors, if any, there would have been a
reasonable probability that the jury would acquitted him of capital murder or would have
sentenced him to something less than death. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695
(1984).
Kell never could have met that burden. There was no substantial question about
Kell's guilt. The jury saw a videotape of Kell stabbing Blackmon sixty-seven times. They
saw him twice walk away from Blackmon, then return to inflict more wounds.
Similarly, there was no substantial question about the penalty Kell should receive. In
addition to seeing the brutal attack, which included stab wounds to Blackmon's eyes, the

5

As detailed in point II, Kell could not rely on trial and appellate counsel's alleged
ineffective assistance to relitigate the claims that he raised and lost at trial and on direct
appeal.
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jury heard KelPs history of extensive violence and threats of violence while incarcerated.
It knew that revenge and racial hatred motivated the murder. It knew that Kell murdered a
fellow inmate while housed in a maximum security unit. The jury knew that Kell murdered
Blackmon while serving the next lowest sentence allowed by law: life without the possibility
of parole. The jury also knew that Kell's LWOP sentence actually encouraged Kell's
violence because Kell perceived that he had nothing to lose. The irrefutable evidence
established beyond all doubt Kell's future dangerousness, which is a highly aggravating
sentencing factor. S. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think? ("Garvey"), 1998 Columbia L. Rev. 1538, 1559 (summarizing the then available
results of the capital jury project, which showed that capital jurors found future
dangerousness to be "highly aggravating"). The jury that had to decide whether to give Kell
a sentence less than death knew that all means to deter Kell's violence short of a death
sentence had been exhausted to no avail. Nothing Kell's counsel could have done would
have saved Kell's life.
Because Kell never could have proven Stricklandiprejudice, his post-conviction claims
all failed as a matter of law.
II.

THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT
COULD NOT GRANT POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ON CLAIMS
THAT KELL RAISED AND LOST ON DIRECT APPEAL6
In his amended petition, Kell claimed that the trial court violated his constitutional

6

This point responds to Kell's point I.
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rights by 1) trying him in the CUCF courtroom; 2) removing two prospective jurors who
were not death qualified; 3) denying his for-cause challenges to three prospective jurors; 4)
allowing the jury to see the videotape of Kell murdering Blackmon; and 5) admitting the
autopsy report into evidence (KIIR254-66.) Kell raised and lost all of these claims on direct
appeal. Kell, 2002 UT 106 ffif 11-21, 29-31, 39-40. The post-conviction court granted
summary judgment on them, recognizing that a petitioner may not obtain post-conviction
relief for claims that he raised and lost on direct appeal, and that the ineffective-assistance
exception does not apply (KIIR608-10).
That ruling was correct. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act bars post-conviction
relief for claims that were raised and lost at trial or on direct appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-106(l)(b) (West 2004). Applying that proscription, this Court has recognized that
"[c]laims that were brought on direct appeal are ineligible for consideration in postconviction actions." Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73 f 44, 586 Utah Adv. Rep. 13.
Kell has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's ruling. Kell first argues
that he was "able to raise any and all issues that were laid out in his petition under [Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35-106(2)], i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel." Appellant's Brief at 14.
Kell is wrong.
The relevant subsections of section 106 bar post-conviction relief on "any ground that:
. . . (b) was raised or addressed at trial or an appeal; [or] (c) could have been but was not
raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) and (c) (West 2004).
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Section 106 further provides that "fnjotwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be
eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(2) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, the ineffective-assistance
procedural-bar exception applies only to claims that could have been, but were not raised in
the criminal proceedings. No exception applies to claims that were litigated and lost on
direct appeal. Therefore, Kell's reliance on alleged ineffective assistance to avoid the
litigation-and-lost procedural bar is misplaced.
This Court similarly has recognized that the ineffective-assistance exception applies
only to overlooked claims, but not to raised and lost claims. In Lafferty, after holding that
litigated and lost claims are not eligible for post-conviction relief, this Court continued that
"a claim that could have been brought on direct appeal may not be reviewed unless the
defendant's failure to bring the claim was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel,"
citing sections 106(l)(c) and (2). Lqfferty, 2007 UT 73 ^ 44.7
Even if an ineffective-assistance exception applied to the litigated- and-lost procedural
bar, Kell has not demonstrated that he proffered sufficient evidence or cited sufficient
authority to the post-conviction court to excuse the bar. First, on all but one claim, he merely

7

This Court's pre-PCRA common law rule similarly provided that "issues raised
and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or sentence cannot be raised again in
[post-conviction]. Such issues are dismissed as an abuse of the writ, without a ruling on
the merits." Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96 \ 6, 44 P.3d 626 (citations omitted).
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concludes without any analysis that he could proceed on the barred claims under an
ineffective-assistance theory.

Appellant's Brief at 14.

However, merely incanting

"ineffective assistance" will not defeat a procedural bar. In Lafferty, this Court rejected
Lafferty's reliance on the ineffective-assistance procedural-bar exception in part because
Lafferty pointed to no evidence of constitutionally deficient performance or ofprejudice, and
because Lafferty could not rely a mere repetition of the Strickland standard. See Lafferty,
2007 UT 73 ff 48-51. Similarly, Kell's bare use of the ineffective-assistance label cannot
defeat the procedural bar.
As to the one remaining claim - that counsel ineptly handled the issue of trying the
case at the CUCF courtroom - Kell complains that the post-conviction court should not have
granted summary judgment because he "detailed [for the post-conviction court]
approximately four pages worth of efforts that could and should have been made to block the
trial being held at the CUCF." Appellant' Brief at 23.8 Still, that detail was insufficient to
avoid summary judgment even if the ineffective-assistance exception applied.
To avoid summary judgment, Kell had to make his "best showing" on his burden of
proving ineffective assistance. See Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462

8

Kell makes this argument in connection with his claim that the post-conviction
court should not have dismissed his change-of-venue claim. Id. However, the change-ofvenue claim that he identifies in his brief challenged counsel's handling of motions to
move the trial out of Sanpete county, not the challenges to holding the trial in the CUCF
courtroom (KIIR266). As to the claim about moving the trial from Sanpete county, Kell
makes no argument in this Court about why the the post-conviction court should not have
granted summary judgment.
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(Utah 1960) (summary judgment has a "salutary purpose in our procedure because it
eliminates the time, trouble and expense of a trial when, upon the best showing the plaintiff
can make, he would not be entitled to a judgment"). To prove ineffective assistance, Kell
first would have had to prove that counsel's representation was objectively deficient. See,
e.g-, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 525 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690;
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). In order to
meet that burden, he would have had to overcome a "strong presumption" that counsel
rendered constitutionally sufficient assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Lafferty, 2007
UT 73 U 12; State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 833
(1998). Kell also would have had to prove that, but for counsel's constitutionally deficient
performance, there would be a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695.
Kell's "approximately four pages worth of efforts" that he claims trial counsel "could
and should have [expended] to block the trial being held at the CUCF" consisted of
allegations that counsel should have 1) preserved exhibits that "would reflect or document
the various courtrooms being discussed"; 2) made a record of secure courtrooms that would
have addressed the State's security concerns; 3) provided maps to show whether the
courtrooms were in rural or urban areas; 4) provided maps or videos to demonstrate how the
public would reach the facilities; 5) made a record of the courtrooms' dimensions or physical
layout (including furniture placement); 6) made a record of courtroom amenities, such as
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storage lockers, bathroom facilities, fire code room capacity, etc.; 7) made a record of the
courtrooms' appearance, including the difference in the quality of courtroom furnishings and
"official courtroom regalia;" 8) made a record of how a person gets into the courtroom; 9)
made a record about whether the CUCF facility complied with OSHA and ADA
requirements; 10) preserved evidence about whether the facility carried premises liability
insurance; and 11) obtained records of any investigations by the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches (KIIR464-73). However, Kell cited no authority available to his trial and
appellate counsel that made any of these areas of inquiry integral to opposing trial in the
CUCF courtroom.9
Further, Kell only cited areas of potential investigation. However, his claim could
have succeeded only if he proved that the investigation would have produced evidence that
was reasonably likely to have affected the outcome of his trial or appeal. See, e.g., Taylor,
947 P.2d at 687 (Taylor failed to prove prejudice because he did not offer the mitigating
evidence that Taylor claimed his counsel was ineffective for overlooking), cert, denied, 525
U.S. 833 (1998)). He proffered to the post-conviction court no such evidence. For this
reason alone his "approximately four pages worth of efforts" were insufficient to withstand
summary judgment.
Kell next argues that the post-conviction court should have allowed him to re-raise

9

For example, Kell cited no controlling authority establishing that it would have
been unconstitutional to try him in the CUCF courtroom unless it had certain "regalia,"
had a certain standard of furnishings, or were wheelchair accessible.
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the claims that he lost on direct appeal because they alleged constitutional defects in his
conviction and sentence, and because he alleged that counsel were ineffective. For support,
he cites to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104. Appellant's Brief at 14. It appears that Kell
intends to argue that section 104 exempts certain kinds of claims from the procedural bar
provisions.
In fact, section 104 makes clear that the procedural-bar provisions limit the
availability of all post-conviction relief. Section 104 lists the kinds of claims that may justify
post-conviction relief, including that a conviction or sentence violates the Utah or United
States constitutions, or that counsel was ineffective. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104(1) (West
2004). However, it reads that relief is available "[u]nless precluded by Section 78-35a-106."
Section 106 is the procedural bar provision. Thus, section 104 makes Kell's claims subject
to, rather than exempt from, the procedural bar provisions.
Finally, Kell contends that the post-conviction court should not have dismissed as
procedurally barred his post-conviction challenge to holding the trial at the CUCF courtroom
because a post-appeal Oregon Supreme Court case supports the claim. Appellant's Brief at
14. Kell did not make this argument to the post-conviction court. Therefore, he may succeed
on appeal only if he can establish that the post-conviction court plainly erred by not allowing
him to proceed to the claims' merits. To meet that burden, Kell must establish that Utah law
clearly required the post-conviction court to excuse the raised-and-lost procedural bar and
allow Kell to re-raise his claim in light of a case decided by a sister state's supreme court.
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See, e.g., State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106 1J32, 61 P.3d 1019 (this Court will review arguments
raised for the first time on appeal only for plain error); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403405 (Utah 1994) (same), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995).
Kell has not acknowledged his failure to preserve the argument or argued plain error.
By itself, that failure defeats his claim. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 <[ffl 46-48, 106
P.3d 734.
Alternatively, Kell cannot establish plain error.

The PCRA anticipates post-

conviction relief only for retroactive new rules of law pronounced by the United States
Supreme Court, this Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104(2)
(West 2004). Kell cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, that would allow him
to re-argue in post-conviction review a claim that he lost on direct appeal based on noncontrolling authority from a sister-state's supreme court.
The post-conviction court correctly dismissed as procedurally barred all of the claims
that Kell raised and lost on direct appeal.
III.

THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON KELL'S CLAIM THAT HIS
APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE CHALLENGED THE
DEATH-QUALIFICATION PROCESS OR THE TRIAL COURT'S
REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINITIONS10
Kell asked for post-conviction relief because the trial court death-qualified the jury,

which he claimed led to a more conviction-prone jury (KIIR259). He also claimed that the

10

This point responds to Kell's point II.
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trial court's reasonable doubt definitions "did not provide sufficient guidance to the burden
of proof to the jurors" (KIIR265). The post-conviction court ruled that these claims were
procedurally barred because Kell could have, but did not raise them on direct appeal and had
not shown that the failure to raise them resulted from appellate counsel's ineffective
assistance (KIIR610-11). On appeal, Kell does not challenge the post-conviction court's
ruling that the claims were procedurally barred, only its ruling on Kell had not raised a fact
issue on the ineffective-assistance exception. The post-conviction court's ruling was correct.
In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Kell would have
had to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim that probably would have
succeeded. See, e.g., Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 ^ 48. However, Kell's appellate counsel was
obligated to identify and apply only existing law. See, e.g., id. at ^f 24.
Kell's own admissions to the post-conviction court defeated his claim that appellate
counsel should have argued that death-qualifying the jury required reversal. Kell admitted
that his appellate counsel had no authority available to him that would have supported a
challenge to the death-qualification process. (KIIR470). To the contrary, existing law
foreclosed that claim.11 Kell had a right to counsel who would find and apply existing law,

u

See, e.g, Lockhartv. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167-84 (1986) (although questioning
the validity of studies offered to demonstrate that death-qualified juries are more
conviction-prone, the Supreme Court nevertheless assumed the studies demonstrated that
proposition, but still found that death qualifying juries did not violate McCree's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1253 (Utah 1988)
(relying on McCree, the Utah Supreme Court perfunctorily rejected Lafferty's argument
that death-qualifying the jury resulted in a conviction-prone jury), habeas corpus granted
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not to counsel who would make arguments foreclosed by existing law. See Lqfferty, 2007
UT 73 If 24 (affirming summary judgment on Lafferty's claim that his appellate counsel
should have challenged the death-qualification process because controlling United States
Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court authority had held that death-qualifying a jury was
not unconstitutional).
The post-conviction court also correctly rejected KelPs claim that his appellate
counsel should have challenged the reasonable doubt definitions that the trial court gave.12
Kell identified for the post-conviction no specific defect in either instruction that he believed
appellate counsel should have argued. Kell cited to the post-conviction court no authority
available to appellate counsel that should have alerted him to any unidentified defect in either
instruction or that would have supported an appellate challenge. See Taylor v. Warden, 905
P.2d 277, 285 (Utah ) (Taylor failed to prove ineffective-assistance based on counsel's
failure to file pre-trial motions where he failed to identify "what they would have been based
on or how he could have prevailed"). Kell's bare allegation that counsel had a constitutional
obligation to raise the argument was insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See
on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
12

At the guilt phase, the trial court instructed the jury that reasonable doubt meant a
doubt "based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation, supposition,
emotion or sympathy. It must be reasonable and not merely imaginary. It is such as
would be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration
of all the evidence" (KIR2295, addendum D). At the penalty phase, the trial court
defined reasonable doubt as "doubt. .. based on reason and common sense and not on
speculation or imagination. . . . [It] must satisfy the mind and convince those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon such proof (KIR2356, addendum E).
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Lafferty, 2007 UT 73ffif48-51.
For the first time in this appeal, Kell argues that the trial court's reasonable doubt
definitions mirrored that which this Court purportedly found to be "reversible error" in
Reyes, 2005 UT 33. Appellant's Brief at 23. However, Kell cannot succeed on this
argument unless he establishes that the post-conviction court should have concluded on its
own that Reyes required appellate counsel to raise a claim that probably would have
succeeded. See, e.g., Kell, 2002 UT 106 ^32; Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403-405. See also
Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 ^f 48. Kell has not acknowledged his failure to preserve the argument
or argued plain error. That failure alone defeats his claim. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^[46-48.
In any event, Reyes could not have alerted the post-conviction court to any obvious
ineffective assistance. This Court decided Reyes approximately seven years after the trial
court instructed the jury and over three years after Keifs direct appeal concluded. Thus,
Reyes does not establish that appellate counsel plainly failed to "identify and apply existing
law." Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 f 24.13

13

Even if Reyes were relevant, it would not have shown that counsel was
ineffective. The reasonable doubt definition under review in Reyes closely tracked the
definitions given in this case. Compare Reyes, 2005 UT 33 ^f 2, with KIR2295 and 2356.
However, this Court held that the Reyes reasonable definition did not constitute reversible
error. Id. at \ 34. Reyes stands for the proposition opposite that for which Kell cites it.
See also State v. Austin, 2007 UT 55 ^ 7, 165 P-3d 1191.
Also for the first time on appeal, Kell argues that, "although [the Reyes] instruction
has been found to pass Constitutional scrutiny by this Court under Federal Constitutional
analysis {See Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739 (2007)) it was and is still error under State
Constitutional grounds." Appellant's Brief at 23. Kell cites no case that the postconviction court should have recognized was available to appellate counsel that would
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Kell's other arguments demonstrate no error in the post-conviction court's rejection
of these two claims. Kell argues that the post-conviction court's ruling "begs the question
as to if appellate counsel did not raise [the omitted claims], who would?" Appellant's Brief
at 18. He contends that "this is the very kernel of ineffective assistance of counsel: had prior
counsel actually provided effective assistance, then these claims would have been brought
on direct appeal." Id. (emphasis in original).
This Court already has rejected this identical "very kernel" argument, holding that it
"misconstrue[s] the premise of [the Court's] ineffective assistance of counsel standard.
Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise '"every nonfrivolous issue on appeal... [and may]
' winnow out' weaker claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely to prevail.'"
Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 If 49 (quoting Carter, 2001 UT 96 If 48 (citation omitted). See also
Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53 ^f 24 (appellate counsel is not obligated to raise every
nonfrivolous claim).
Kell also asserts that 1) if appellate counsel's failure to raise the two claims "was
knowing and intentional, as an appeal strategy, it was woefully below a recognized standard

have demonstrated that a reasonable doubt definition similar to the one that this Court
affirmed in Reyes violated some unidentified provision of the Utah Constitution. The
unpreserved claim therefore fails. Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 24. See also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9)(requiring parties to provide supporting contentions and reasons for their
arguments and to include the grounds for reviewing unpreserved issues); State v. Honie,
2002 UT 4 ^61 n.7, 57 P.3d 977 (declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where
Honie had not demonstrated in "any meaningful fashion" why the Court should apply
cited constitutional provisions to create the proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863
(2002).
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of competence required for capital offense appellate work"; and 2) "the fact that prior
counsel did not bring these claims on direct appeal demonstrates a lack of competence and
ineffective assistance." Appellant's Brief at 18. However, Kell includes no analysis or
authority to support these conclusions. Rather, he merely asserts conclusions that incorporate
the legal standard for deficient performance. Such a bare recitation does not establish that
the post-conviction court erroneously rejected his ineffective-assistance claim. See, e.g.,
Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 ^f 50 ("[t]he mere repetition of the Strickland standard does not create
the demonstrable reality of ineffective assistance necessary to overturn a conviction");
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) (same).
Similarly, Kell never attempts to demonstrate prejudice. He argues only that appellate
counsel's failure to raise challenges to the death qualification process and the jury
instructions defining reasonable doubt prejudiced him "because these claims were never
heard by this Court." Appellant's Brief at 18. However, in order to establish the requisite
prejudice, Kell would have had to prove that the omitted appellate claims likely would have
succeeded. Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 Tj 51. Merely showing that this Court never heard a claim
because appellate counsel did not raise it will not suffice. Id.
The post-conviction court correctly ruled that Kell's ineffective-assistance claims
failed as a matter of law.14

14

As to counsel's failure to challenge the death-qualification process, the Court
may affirm on the alternative basis that Kell's amended petition did not include an
ineffective-assistance claim based on that failure (KIIR259). See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles,
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IV.

KELL'S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO SEEK INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF AN ISSUE
THAT THEY LATER LOST ON PLENARY APPEAL15
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have sought interlocutory review of the trial

court's decision to try him in the CUCF courtroom (KIIR267). The State moved for
summary judgment on the claim. Kell did not oppose the motion, and the post-conviction
court accordingly granted it (KIIR612).
The post-conviction court's disposition was correct. The State's summary judgment
motion obligated Kell to make his "best showing" on his claim that the Sixth Amendment
required trial counsel to seek interlocutory review of the order to try him at CUCF. See
Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462. It shifted to Kell "the burden . . . to present evidence that is
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact" on his claim.

Waddoups v.

2002 UT 58 1(10, 52 P.3d 1158 (an appellate court may affirm on any '"legal ground or
theory apparent on the record'") (citation omitted). After the post-conviction court ruled
on Kell's amended petition, this Court issued its decision in Lafferty. Like Kell, Lafferty
claimed that death-qualifying the jury violated his constitutional rights. Lafferty, 2007
UT 73 Tf 23. Also like Kell, Lafferty's petition included no separate ineffective-assistance
claim related the death qualification process. Id. Instead, Lafferty did not raise the
ineffective-assistance issue until the State moved for summary judgment on the claim
because it was procedurally barred. Id,
This Court disapproved of Lafferty's belated reliance on an ineffective-assistance
argument, holding, "[W]e also object to the way [the ineffective assistance] argument was
raised . . . . Raising an issue for the first time in a memorandum opposing summary
judgment without showing good cause violates the pleading requirements for postconviction petitions, Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c)." Id.
Like Lafferty, Kell did not raise in his amended petition an ineffective-assistance
claim related to the death-qualification process. The Court may affirm the denial of postconviction relief on that alternative basis.
15

This point responds to Kell's point III.
-29-

Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69 131, 54 P.3d 1054,
Kell made no showing at all. Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that
Kell's failure to oppose summary judgment on this claim required the court to grant it. Kell's
failure to oppose summary judgment on this claim waived any appellate challenge to the
post-conviction court's decision to grant it. See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,
Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987).
The Court may affirm on an alternative ground apparent from the record. See, e.g.,
Bailey, 2002 UT 58 ^flO. Specifically, the claim was patently frivolous. Appellate counsel
challenged the decision to try Kell at the CUCF courtroom on plenary, post-judgment review.
This Court rejected his challenge on the merits. Kell, 2002 UT ^[11-16. If counsel had
asked the Court to review the issue sooner and the Court had granted that request, Kell only
would have lost sooner rather than later. See Carter, 2001 UT 96 ^f 48 ("failure to raise an
issue that is without merit 'does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel'") (citation omitted).
Kell's ineffective-assistance claim fails on multiple grounds.
V.

THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON KELL'S REMAINING CLAIMS
In his point IV, Kell argues that the post-conviction court erroneously shifted the

summary judgment burden to him. He then argues that the court erroneously granted
summary judgment on several of his ineffective-assistance claims. Appellant's Brief at 1928.
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As detailed in the following subsections, the post-conviction court correctly assigned
to the State and Kell their respective burdens triggered by the State's summary judgment
motion and correctly granted summary judgment on KelFs claims.
A.

The post-conviction court correctly assigned to the State and to Kell their
respective burdens under the law governing summary judgment practice.
When a party moves for summary judgment and meets its initial burden of supporting

the summary judgment motion with evidence, "the burden . . . shiftfs] to [the nonmoving
party] to present evidence [by affidavit or as otherwise permitted by Utah R. Civ. P. 56] that
is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." Waddoups, 2002 UT 6 9 ^ 3 1
(citations omitted). The nonmoving party may not rely on "'mere allegations or denials'" or
"conclusory assertions" that a genuine, material fact issue exists. Id. See also Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(e) (when a summary judgment motion is supported by evidence, the nonmoving party
"may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings"). Further, the nonmoving
party must make his "best showing" in support of his claims because summary judgment
serves the "salutary purpose" of "eliminat[ing] the time, trouble and expense of a trial when,
upon the best showing the [petitioner] can make, he would not be entitled to a judgment."
Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462 (Utah 1960). The post-conviction court correctly recognized and
applied these burdens (KIIR611).
The State met its initial burden by supporting each of its factual assertions with
citations to the underlying criminal record and providing legal authority to establish that the
record facts coupled with Kell's allegations failed as a matter of law to state a claim for post-31-

conviction relief. Kell has not argued otherwise.
Kell insists, however, that the post-conviction court erroneously shifted the summary
judgment burden to him. Appellant's Brief at 21-22. He argues that "[w]hen the moving
party for summary judgment alleges that an act happened, and the non-moving party indicates
that the act did not happen, the court is left with a 'did not-did so' scenario. Oftentimes, no
evidence exists without an evidentiary hearing, that can show that there is a genuine issue of
material fact except for a non-moving party's insistence that the act did or did not occur."
Id. at 22. Thus, Kell argues that mere allegations and denials will suffice to withstand a
summary judgment motion, and that, as the non-moving party, he was entitled to wait until
an evidentiary hearing to present evidence that may demonstrate a genuine, material fact
issue.
Kell misstates the law. Under the controlling law cited above, all of which Kell
ignores, Kell bore the burden to rebut the State's motion with an evidentiary proffer. He was
not entitled to rest on his mere denials, as he insists here and insisted below. Waddoups,
2002 UT 69 H 31; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Further, Kell had to proffer the evidence that he would present and demonstrate with
appropriate analysis and citation to authority why, if proven and believed, that evidence
would entitle him to post-conviction relief. See Brandt, 3 53 P.2d at 462. He was not entitled
to skip to an evidentiary hearing and hope that the evidence to support his claims would
materialize at that time.

-32-

Because Kell utterly failed to fulfill his burdens, the post-conviction court properly
granted summary judgment against him.
B.

The post-conviction court correctly ruled that Kell established no genuine
material fact issue and that all of his ineffective-assistance claims failed as a
matter of law.

1.

KelPs ineffective assistance claims were run of the mill claims that required him
to prove both Strickland elements.
Kell argues that his allegations establish "per se" deficient performance and "per se"

prejudice. Appellant's Brief at 22. Kell offers no explanation of what he means. To the
extent that he intends his use of "per se" to invite the Court to presume either or both of the
Strickland elements, the governing case law, none of which Kell cites, defeats him.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), recognized that there are circumstances
where both elements of ineffective assistance may be presumed. The Supreme Court
identified Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), as an example of such a case. In Powell,
the trial court appointed an out-of-state attorney on the day of trial to represent Powell. To
resolve counsel's request for time to prepare the case and familiarize himself with local
procedure, the trial court concluded that out-of-state counsel could rely on whatever help the
local bar could provide. The Supreme Court found the likelihood that counsel could perform
effectively under those circumstance so remote that it presumed a denial of the effective
assistance of counsel without examining counsel's actual trial performance. Cronic, 466
U.S. at 658-62.
Kell's counsel were appointed well in advance of trial, filed multiple pre-trial motions,
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engaged in extensive pre-trial motion practice, examined witnesses at the preliminary
hearing, questioned prospective jurors, and presented extensive guilt and penalty phase
evidence.16 The situation under which the Cronic court posited that both Stricklandelements
may be presumed bears no resemblance to KelPs situation.
Cronic also recognized an exception to proving Strickland prejudice where counsel
"entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Cronic,
466 U.S. at 659. However, the failure must be "entire[];" the Cronic exception does not
apply for failing to oppose the prosecution at specific points in the proceedings. Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-97 (2002). Kell challenges counsel's performance on discrete
issues. He has not and cannot demonstrate that his counsel "entirely" failed to represent him.

16

Pre-trial motions, including motions to change venue, declare the death penalty
unconstitutional, sever, exclude the videotape, see, e.g., KIR15-17; 24-30; 39-40; 43-46;
56-57; 94-116; 196-97; 201-08; 227-29; 262-270; 280-81; 286-87; 350-56; 375-77; 39196; 413-18; 421-24; 444-45; 464-74; 491-99; 504-10; 537-48; 575-91; 592-612; 617-19;
624-28; 724-25; 897-99; 900-12; 918-19; 920-31; 932-43; 935-36; 937-49; 950-57; 95864; 965-83; 984-992; 993-1021; 1022-31; 1032-39; 1040-42; 1043-45; 1316-45; 1364-74;
1375; 1376-1406; 1439-49; 1507-10; 1511-13; 1514-16; 1517-44; 1555-77; 1595-96;
1603-04; 1639-45; 1675-77; 1678-84; 1686-93; 1735-44; 1745-54; 1755-56; 1763-80;
1781-98; 1799-1812; 1821-23; 1843-45; 1846-56; 1859-62; 1863-66; 1867-1871; 18901932; 1933-1948; 1954-55; 2005-14; 2071-80; 2389-2392; 2392-94; 2403-05; 2456-57;
and 2484-85. August 12, 1994, hearing to appoint counsel, T7520-65. Two day
preliminary hearing, T2664-2920; 2923-3086. Hearings on various pre-trial motions, see,
e.g., T5759-5800; 5802-5872; 5918-5927; 7650-7704; 7811-7926; 7930-7960; 79628107, 8108-8291; 8293-8302; 8307-8483; 8485-8596; 5874-5896; 8663-8705; 87078784; 8793-8859; and 8868-9005. Jury voir dire, see generally, II through VI. Guilt
phase opening statement, VII4560-71; guilt phase defense case 1X4919-5006, X5013-86;
guilt phase closing, XII5452-56; penalty phase defense case IV5637-80; and penalty
phase defense closing, IV5696-5718. In addition, defense counsel cross-examined the
State's witnesses at both the guilt and penalty phases.
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Kell's claims were run of the mill ineffective-assistance claims. As detailed in point
II, Kell therefore had the burden of proving both deficient performance and prejudice. See
point II and cited cases. As detailed in the following subsections, the post-conviction court
correctly ruled that he raised no genuine material fact issue on any of his ineffectiveassistance claims.
2.

Kell has not argued or shown that the post-conviction court plainly erred by
rejecting his claim that trial counsel should have challenged the instructions
defining reasonable doubt.
Kell also claimed that his trial counsel should have challenged the trial court's

reasonable doubt definitions (KIIR265). The post-conviction court granted summary
judgment because Kell did not "describe how the reasonable doubt instruction was
inadequate" (KIIR614).
That ruling was correct. Kell failed to make his "best showing" when he relied on
nothing more than his bare allegation the trial court misdefmed reasonable doubt. Further,
as explained in point III, Kell did not make to the post-conviction court the arguments he
raises here, and his arguments rely solely on law unavailable to his trial counsel, and on a
misstatement of the cited law at that.
3.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's claim that the Sixth
Amendment required his counsel to admit the entire "Dear Luther" letter.
The "Dear Luther" letter was a letter that Kell wrote to a Nevada inmate sometime

between the Payne and Blackmon fights, and the day Kell murdered Blackmon (KIIR365-69,
addendum F; 402-405, addendum G, and 407-10, addendum H). The State offered a redacted
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version of the letter to show that Kell murdered Blackmon out of racial hatred and in
retaliation for Blackmon's "cheap shot" against Payne (113332-52; VIII4757-62). Trial
counsel moved to exclude the entire letter (KIR1890-1926). The trial court admitted the
redacted version (VIII4762, 4831).
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have sought to admit the unredacted letter
(KIIR265-66). That claim is frivolous, and the post-conviction court correctly denied it
(KIIR614-15).
The letter was redacted for Kell's benefit. As redacted, the letter informed the jury
of Kell's racial and revenge motives specific to Blackmon and to the Blackmon murder
(KIIR364-71). The complete letter would have been damning to Kell. Among other things,
it would have told the jury determining Kell's guilt of his general racism as evinced by his
consistent use of "nigger" or "nig," his disgust for white inmates who did not share his racist
views, his attempts to spread his racism, and his envy of another inmate's photograph
depicting a white inmate eating a sandwich near an African-American inmate's dead body.
The jury would have read of Kell's satisfaction about potential security flaws in his housing
unit, read his boasts of assaulting a S.W.A.T. team member, and read his proclamation of the
need for reprisal against an inmate "throwing" another inmate's name (KIIR402-405, 40710).
Rather than help Kell, this information would have bolstered the State's racial
motivation theory and would have informed the jury aboutKell's general racism, criminality,
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and threat to prison security. Counsel chose the better course by attempting to keep the letter
out entirely rather than moving to admit the entire letter.17
4.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs bare allegation that trial
counsel conducted an inadequate pre-trial investigation.
Kell claimed that his counsel "failed to conduct effective and complete pretrial

investigation and was not able to devote the necessary time to Kell's case due to the rigorous
demand's [sic] of trial counsel's practice" (KIIR266). The post-conviction court granted
summary judgment because Kell gave no "specific examples of deficiencies during the
pretrial investigation" and did not "indicate how these failings prejudiced him" (KIIR61516). That ruling was correct.
Kell had the ultimate burden of proving "specific" acts or omissions that fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Further,
Kell had the burden of proving the specific evidence that trial counsel would have discovered
with the unidentified additional investigation, see Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687, and that, if the
jury had heard the additional unidentified evidence, there would have been a reasonable

17

Kell also concludes that counsel failed to comply with ABA Guideline
11.5.1(B)12. Even if true, a mere failure to comply with the ABA Guidelines does not
demonstrate deficient performance. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81 f90, 150 P.3d 480.
See also Lajferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 34 (the ABA Guidelines "do not. . . establish a rigid
checklist or set of rules that counsel must satisfy in order to provide effective
representation"). In any event, the cited ABA Guideline suggests only that capital
defense counsel should seek to litigate evidentiary issues through pre-trial motions in
limine. Kell's counsel did so when he moved to exclude the entire letter (KIR18901926).
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probability of a more favorable result, see Taylor, 2007 UT 12 ^ 56, 156 P.3d 739. Kell
could not meet his burdens with a mere allegation of ineffective assistance, see Fernandez,
870 P.2d at 877, and, to withstand summary judgment, he had to make his "best showing"
on both Strickland elements, Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462.
Kell did none of this. Kell never identified, let alone proffered, any evidence of the
specific investigation that he claimed the Sixth Amendment required his counsel to perform.
He never identified or proffered any proof of the actual evidence that the unidentified
investigation would have yielded. Kell's "best showing" failed as a matter of law to establish
that he would have been entitled to post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court
correctly granted summary judgment on this claim.
For the first time on appeal, Kell argues that his trial counsel failed "to live up to the
ABA's standards," and allegedly did not meet the ABA Guidelines qualifications.
Appellant's Brief at 23. Kell did not make these arguments below and has not argued plain
error on appeal. The claim fails for that reason alone. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^[46-48.
In any event, a mere failure to comply with the ABA Guidelines will not demonstrate
deficient performance. See, e.g., Menzies, 2006 UT 81 ^[90. Similarly, any defect in
counsel's qualifications cannot establish deficient performance. The Stricklandelements of
an ineffective-assistance claim look to what counsel did or did not do and whether counsel's
action or inaction adversely affected the outcome; they do not look to counsel's resume. See,
e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. See also Lafferty, 2007 UT 73ffif32-33 (holding that the
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failure to meet Utah R. Crim. P. 8's qualification requirements "without more .. . does not
establish deficiency" under Strickland)', Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282 (counsel's failure to meet
"prevailing norms" of experience will not establish ineffective assistance).
Alternatively, Kell proffered no evidence below to support the argument. He
proffered no evidence of what investigation counsel did do, let alone demonstrated that it was
less than what the ABA Guidelines suggested. He proffered no evidence of counsel's
reasons for passing over additional investigation, if, in fact, they did so. He proffered no
evidence of counsel's qualifications. Because he proffered none of this evidence below, he,
of course, cites no record support for the argument that he first raises on appeal.
5.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs challenge to counsel's pretrial motion practice.
Kell claimed that his trial counsel inadequately researched and briefed pre-trial

motions (KIIR267). The post-conviction court granted summary judgment because Kell did
not specify which motions were inadequately briefed (KIIR618-19). That ruling was correct.
This Court's precedent dictated that outcome. In Taylor v. Warden, this Court
rejected Taylor's challenge to his trial counsel's pre-trial motion practice because Taylor did
not "specify what [the motions] would have been based on," specify "how [Taylor] could
have prevailed," or "show that if he had prevailed on any given motions, a different outcome
would have resulted." Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, Ml U.S.
365, 389 (1986) (to prove Strickland prejudice from counsel's failure to move to suppress
evidence, Kimmelman had to prove that there would have been a "reasonable probability
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. . . that the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt concerning Kimmelman's guilt
if the [seized evidence] and related testimony had been excluded"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687-88,690 (persons challenging their counsel's representation must point to "specific" acts
and omissions that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness).
Kell never 1) identified which pre-trial motions that he claims his counsel
inadequately briefed and researched; 2) identified any specific deficiency in any pre-trial
research and briefing; 3) identified what additional and superior research and briefing were
constitutionally required; 4) presented any authority or analysis to demonstrate that the
additional research would have made it reasonably likely that the unidentified motions would
have succeeded; or 5) presented any analysis to demonstrated that, if any unidentified motion
had succeeded, there would have been a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable trial
outcome. Controlling authority dictated the judgment against Kell.
On appeal, Kell argues only that the pre-trial motions are part of the record.
Therefore, according to Kell, his allegations were "sufficient on their face to show a violation
of both prongs of Strickland" Appellant's Brief at 24.
Kell misses the point. Both below and in this Court, Kell merely concludes without
any analysis or citation to authority that counsel's motion practice violated Strickland. He
has attempted to shift to the courts the burden of trying to figure out how. The postconviction court correctly declined to accept that burden, and, as it has in the past, this Court
should as well. See, e.g., Honie, 2002 UT 4 ^ 67 ("a reviewing court is not simply a
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depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research").
6.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs claim that his counsel should
have called additional witnesses or looked for additional impeachment evidence.
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have 1) called three inmates who allegedly

could have rebutted the State's argument that the prison had procedures to address inmate
threats; 2) called two unidentified black inmates who allegedly could have rebutted the
"racist claim"; 3) obtained unidentified State's witnesses' "jackets," which allegedly could
have revealed unidentified potential credibility issues; and 4) requested from the prosecutor
Kell's unidentified racist statements that unidentified inmates overheard (KIIR267). The
post-conviction court denied the claim, ruling that Kell proffered no evidence to establish
prejudice on the first allegation, and that Kell supported the rest of the allegations with
insufficient facts to withstand summary judgment (KIIR617-18). That ruling was correct.
At trial, Kell contended that he could not have relied on institutional procedures to
resolve Blackmon's alleged threat (1X4931-32, 4936-37, 4968; X5130-31, 5182-84, 5198;
XI4956-57, 4968, 4979-80.) Even assuming that the three witnesses could have supported
that theory, Kell cannot prove prejudice. Trial counsel presented videotaped depositions
from two inmates who testified that threats from other inmates had to be taken seriously and
that reporting inmate threats to prison authorities was not a sufficient remedy (XIV5655-56;
T5931:3-5, 10-12, 14-17, 19; T5964:3-4, 11-13). The jury did not find this to be sufficient
justification for killing Blackmon. Proffering more of the same kind of evidence that failed
to convince the jury in the first place does not raise a material fact issue on counsel's
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assistance. See James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 557 (10th Cir. 2000) (James failed to prove
Strickland prejudice by proffering in habeas corpus review additional mitigation evidence
that was largely cumulative of that which counsel presented at trial); Castro v. Ward, 138
F.3d 810, 828-29 (10th Cir.) (proffered post conviction evidence from a different mental
health expert, although more detailed and adding an organic brain damage diagnosis not
previously provided, was insufficient to demonstrate a due process violation where the
additional evidence was not different "in kind" from that which the sentencing jury heard),
cert, denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998). See also Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 31 (Lafferty failed to
prove ineffective-assistance at the penalty phase where his post-conviction proffer consisted
of the very evidence that his trial court presented at trial).18
The post-conviction court also correctly rejected KelFs claims that counsel should
have called two unidentified black inmates to rebut the "racist claim." Kell never proffered
evidence of what the two unidentified inmates would have testified to or even identified who
they were. See, e.g., Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687. At trial, counsel presented testimony from
inmates that he was not a racist; the testimony did not persuade the jury in his favor. See

18

The Court may affirm on the alternative basis that Kell alleged no facts known to
trial counsel or of which counsel should have been aware that, if proven, would have
required counsel to investigate the testimony that he claims the three inmates could have
provided. He alleged no facts that would have demonstrated that these witness were
available at the time he was tried. Although he generically states that they could have
rebutted the State's argument that the prison had procedures to address inmate threats, he
did not allege what their testimony would have been, demonstrated that it would have
been so compelling that counsel would have been obligated to call them, or that it would
have made a more favorable outcome at either phase reasonably probable.
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James, 211 F.3d at 557; Castro, 138 F.3d at 828-29. Moreover, the redacted "Dear Luther"
letter demonstrated the racial motive for the murder. The unredacted letter, which Kell
asserts his counsel should have introduced, overwhelmingly demonstrated his general racism.
Unidentified testimony from two unidentified black inmates could not have changed the
evidentiary picture enough to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Kell also proffered no evidence of what impeachment evidence actually existed in any
witness's "jacket." He never identified the overheard racist statements that he claims trial
counsel should have requested from the prosecutor or offer any evidence that his trial counsel
did not know about them. As stated, counsel attempted to address the issue of KelPs racism;
it did not change the outcome.
Finally, for the reasons demonstrated in point I, there was no real issue about Kell's
guilt or even the appropriate sentence. Presenting cumulative evidence on whether Kell was
racist and whether he should have reported Blackmon's threat rather than kill Blackmon, or
unidentified impeachment evidence of unidentified witnesses would not have changed the
outcome at either phase.
7.

Kell has never demonstrated that statements to prison guards that he would fake
his remorse tipped the penalty balance against him.
Kell claimed that his counsel should have cautioned him against confiding in prison

guards (KIIR267). The claim referred to the prison guards' testimony that Kell faked his
remorse at the penalty phase. The post-conviction court granted summary judgment because
Kell had not demonstrated how his statements to the guards prejudiced the penalty outcome
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(KIIR618-19).
On appeal, Kell merely concludes that the officers' rebuttal testimony "was
sufficiently damaging to make the difference between a finding of life without parole and a
finding for the death penalty . . . . Petitioner feels that if this is not prejudice, than no
prejudice in the realm of the law can exist." Appellant's Brief at 25. Kell offers no analysis
of how5 in light of the entire penalty-phase evidentiary picture, the jury likely would have
spared his life if they had believed his apology. If merely repeating the Strickland standard
cannot suffice to meet Kell's burden, see, e.g., Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 ^J 50, then merely
professing his feeling that counsel prejudiced his case also cannot.
Further, the record defeats Kell's feeling that the officers' testimony prejudiced him.
Given the planning and viciousness of the attack and Kell's glee after finishing Blackmon
off, the jury likely would have discredited Kell's remorse even without the officer's
testimony. The jury likely would have concluded that any genuine remorse that Kell felt
arose from the possible punishment that he faced, not the acts that justified imposing it. As
demonstrated in point I, Ihe State presented an overwhelming aggravation case that led to one
inevitable conclusion: only a death sentence could address Kell's relentless violence.19

19

The Court may affirm on the alternative basis that Kell proffered no analysis or
facts to demonstrate that his counsel were deficient. See, e.g., Bailey, 2002 UT 58 ^[10.
In essence, Kell claims that his counsel should have cautioned him against making
statements that may have impaired his chances of bamboozling the jury into believing that
he was sorry for murdering Blackmon. Kell offered no evidence that he informed his
counsel that his remorse for murdering Blackmon would be nothing but an Academy
Award winning performance. He cites nothing else suggesting that counsel should have
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8.

KelPs challenge to counsel's failure to raise a due process challenge based on
KelPs original transfer to Utah was frivolous.
Kell claimed that his counsel should have argued that his transfer from Nevada to

Utah violated due process because it was illegal (KIIR267-68, 486). In his summary
judgment opposition, Kell explained that counsel should have claimed that the illegal transfer
"purposely" placed him in a dangerous "kill or be killed" situation (KIIR486). The postconviction court granted summary judgment because 1) the claim was tied to the self-defense
claim that this Court rejected on direct appeal; and 2) Kell had not demonstrated prejudice
from counsel's failure to raise the claim. (KIIR619-20).
Kell argues that the post-conviction court erred because "[c]learly, the due process
claim does not rest only on a self-defense claim but on a prejudice claim that 'but for' the
transfer, Kell would never have been put in the same facility in the same circumstances with
Mr. Blackmon." Appellant's Brief at 25. To the extent Kell contends that his counsel could
have avoided a capital murder conviction or death sentence by arguing that the real cause of
Blackmon's death was an illegal transfer to Utah, he has never cited any authority available
to counsel that would have supported such a claim. Further, Kell never has proffered any

anticipated that he might make such a statement to the prison guards and warned him
against doing so. Moreover, trial counsel obviously knew that, at the time of his capital
murder trial, Kell had already spent several years in prison. Kell had threatened a prison
guard in the Nevada penal system because she had disclosed to her supervisors statements
that Kell made to her. Kell's prison experience would have given his trial counsel every
reason to assume that Kell knew better than to treat prison guards as his confidantes.
Kell's allegations did not overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered
constitutionally adequate representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690.
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evidence or legal authority to demonstrate that the transfer was illegal. Therefore, he never
raised a genuine material fact issue about whether counsel overlooked a claim that would
have been reasonably likely to avoid his conviction. See, e.g., Kimmelman, All U.S. at 389;
Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285.
9.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs claim that his counsel should
have discovered that the State presented perjured testimony.
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have discovered and objected that the State

allegedly presented perjured testimony from inmate Francisco Colon, who witnessed Kell
murder Blackmon (XI5307-5316). (KIIR268). The post-conviction court granted summary
judgment because Kell proffered no specific facts to support the claim (KIIR620). That
ruling was correct.
To succeed on a claim that the State presented perjured testimony, Kell's trial counsel
would have had to show that 1) Colon perjured himself; 2) the State knew that Colon
perjured himself; and 3) that "'there [was] any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury.'" State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1228
(Utah 1986)(citation omitted). Kell proffered no evidence that Colon in fact perjured himself
or that the State knew that he had and failed to disclose it. In fact, Kell never alleged what
part of Colon's testimony he alleges was false. Further, Kell never explained how, absent
any unidentified perjured testimony, there would have been "any reasonable likelihood" that
the jury, who witnessed Kell murder Blackmon via the videotape, would have acquitted him
capital murder.
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On appeal, Kell argues only that the post-conviction court should not have granted
summary judgment because he "alleged that a prosecution witness . . . perjured himself and
that counsel failed to point out that perjury to discredit the witness." Appellant's Brief at 25.
Thus, Kell persists that his bare allegations sufficed to withstand the State's motion. For the
reasons argued in subsection A above, they were not.
10.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's challenge to his trial counsel's
jury-selection decisions.
Kell claimed that his counsel should have challenged for cause five prospective jurors

that counsel removed with peremptory challenges (KIIR268-70). The post-conviction court
rejected the claims. Applying the deferential standard that this Court established in State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, for assessing counsel's jury selection decisions, the
post-conviction court concluded that Kell had established no genuine fact issue on the
Strickland deficient performance element. The court also concluded that Kell had not
produced facts showing prejudice. (KIIR620-22.)
On appeal, Kell challenges only the post-conviction court's prejudice determination.
However, he had to prove both Strickland elements in order to succeed on the claim.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690, 695. His failure even to argue any error in the postconviction court's rejection of his deficiency argument independently requires affirming the
judgment against him on this claim.
Alternatively, Kell has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's ruling that
he made an insufficient proffer on the Strickland prejudice element. Kell states only that he
-47-

"would argue that a biased juror is, per se, prejudice . . . ." Appellant's Brief at 25-26.
However, trial counsel removed with peremptory challenges all of the prospective jurors that
Kell claims were biased; therefore, his jury included no biased juror.
11.

The post-conviction court properly rejected Kell's claim that trial counsel should
have objected that unidentified portions of the State's opening statements were
argumentative.
Kell claimed thai his trial counsel should have objected to unidentified portions of the

State's opening statements at the guilt and penalty phases because they allegedly were
"argumentative" (KIIR270-71, 488-89). The post-conviction court granted the State's
summary judgment motion because Kell failed to identify the allegedly argumentative
statements or show how an objection would have affected the trial outcome (KIIR622).
On appeal, Kell argues only that "[t]he transcripts are part of the record and no further
production of specific evidence is necessary when the record is part of what is to be
considered in summary judgment." Appellant's Brief at 26. Again, Kell misses the point.
The post-conviction court granted summary judgment not because Kell failed to proffer
additional evidence, but because Kell failed to point to the objectionable material that was
in the record. The post-conviction court was not obligated to read the prosecutor's opening
statements and try to intuit what Kell believed was sufficiently argumentative to necessitate
an objection or analyze for him whether any argumentative statement probably affected the
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guilt or penalty phase outcomes. Cf, e.g., Honie, 2002 UT4 \6l n.7. °
12.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's claim that his counsel gave
him inadequate advice about whether to testify at the guilt phase.
Kell claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because they allegedly failed to

give him sufficient advice about whether to testify in the guilt phase (KIIR270). The postconviction court granted summary judgment on this claim because Kell failed to "provide[]
specific facts" to support it (KIIR623).
The post-conviction court's ruling was correct. Keifs theory at the guilt phase was
that he had to kill Blackmon before Blackmon killed him, and he so testified. Kell further
testified that he believed, based on his experiences in prison and his awareness of
Blackmon's reputation, that Blackmon posed a real threat. (X5050-5132.) Kell proffered
to the post-conviction court no other means available to counsel to present this evidence to
the jury, and only Kell could provide direct evidence of his motive for the video-taped
murder.
On appeal, Kell argues only that "[t]he Petition is a statement from the Petitioner on
his behalf. His allegation is a specific fact that he indicated to [post-conviction] counsel who

20

The State does not agree that Kell necessarily could rely solely on the record of
the argument. Even if State's counsel's made an objectionable statement, counsel may
have had a legitimate reason not to object. Without evidence of why counsel chose not to
object, Kell cannot overcome the "strong presumption" that counsel rendered
constitutionally sufficient assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Cf. also Carter,
2001 UT 96 TJ41 (counsel's juror selection decisions are presumed to be constitutionally
sufficient even though they may appear to be counterintuitive on the cold record).
Counsel proffered no evidence on counsel's reasons for not objecting.
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was drafting the Petition." Appellant's Brief at 26. In essence, Kell contends that he was
allowed to rest on the unsworn allegations in his Amended Petition to oppose summary
judgment. As demonstrated in subsection A, he was not.
Even if Kelt's unsworn allegations in the Amended Petition could stand in for a sworn
statement, they were insufficient as a matter of law to withstand summary judgment. The
allegations merely concluded that his counsel "failed to adequately advise him" about
testifying at the guilt phase. A party opposing summary judgment may not rely on
"conclusory statements." Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 ^} 31 (party opposing summary judgment
may not rely on "conclusory assertions"). Kell's bare allegation did not overcome the
"strong presumption" that counsel gave Kell adequate advice about testifying, especially
given that only Kell could give direct evidence in support of his defense theory. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
13.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's claim that his counsel should
have ensured that all bench conferences were recorded.
Kell claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did not insist on

recording every bench conference, "even though this was a death penalty case" (KIIR270).
The post-conviction court corrected rejected this claim because Kell proffered no evidence
of how recording bench conferences "would have produced a different outcome" for Kell
(KIIR623).
The post-conviction court's ruling was correct. Kell had to prove that any decision
by counsel not to have a bench conference recorded affected the outcome of his trial or
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appeal. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Carter, 2001 UT 96 \ 48. He proffered no
evidence that any unrecorded bench conference had any effect on the outcome of either trial
phase or the direct appeal.
On appeal, Kell contends only that counsel's failure to insist on recording all bench
conferences "is, per se, prejudicial since there is no possibility of finding out what was said
at the bench conferences in any reliable fashion." Appellant's Brief at 27. Kell did not argue
per se prejudice below and has not argued plain error on appeal. The Court should affirm
on that basis alone. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^[46-48.
Kell also cites no authority that should have made it plain to the post-conviction court
that it had to presume prejudice from counsel's failure to insist on recording every bench
conferences.21 Further, his Court's rules undercut Keifs only rationale for presuming
prejudice: that failing to record the conferences precludes "finding out what was said . . . in
any reliable fashion." Appellant's Brief at 27. Utah R. App. P. 11(g) prescribes a method
to recreate unrecorded proceedings. If the parties cannot stipulate to what happened, the trial
court resolves the differences. Kell has not attempted to recreate any unrecorded conference,
has not identified anything that occurred at any unrecorded conference, and offers no analysis
of how any unidentified argument or unidentified ruling at any unidentified conference
affected the outcome at either the guilt or penalty phase. Indeed, presuming prejudice would

As detailed subsection Bl, the presumed prejudice exception generally applies to
circumstances that do not exist in this case.
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award Kell a new trial for a videotaped murder committed while he was serving a lifewithout-parole-sentence merely because counsel did not insist on recording conferences that
may have concerned nothing more momentous than the most propitious time to take a lunch
or bathroom break.
Kell also argues that failing to ask to record all bench conferences is per se below
Strickland standards and the ABA Guidelines. Strickland says nothing about the failure to
ask to record all bench conferences. The ABA Guidelines are not determinative on what the
Sixth Amendment requires of counsel. Menzies, 2006 UT 81 ^[90. Further, Kell cites
nothing in the Guidelines that require counsel to ask to have all conferences recorded. The
Guidelines admonish that counsel "should take steps where appropriate to preserve, on all
applicable state and Federal grounds, any question for review." 1989 ABA Guidelines 11.7.3
(emphasis added). Kell fails even to argue that any unrecorded conferences dealt with a
"question for review" that otherwise did not appear in the record.
14.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelFs challenge to counsel's
decision not to explain KelPs position in his penalty-phase opening statement.
Kell claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because they "did not make an

opening statement [at the penalty phase] informing the jury of Kell's position" (KIIR271).
The post-conviction court ruled that Kell had not shown that the penalty phase "probably
would have been different" if counsel had made an opening statement (KIIR624).
Kell argues in this appeal only that the post-conviction court should not have granted
summary judgment on this claim because the State did not ask for it. Appellant's Brief at 27.
-52-

In fact, the State's reply memorandum stated, "[T]he State requests that the Court grant
summary judgment on and dismiss with prejudice all of Kell's claims" (KIIR510).
It is true that the State overlooked the claim in its memoranda, but the State's intent
to include all claims was clear. Kell cites no authority for the proposition that the State's
oversight necessitates reversing the post-conviction court's order. Rather, this Court has
"approve[d] of the practice of affirming a lower court on alternative, [even] unbriefed
grounds." State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65 ^19, 147 P.3d 448. The Court should affirm
because the claim was frivolous; therefore, reversing and remanding for briefing and another
ruling in the post-conviction court would not change the outcome.
Kell complained that his counsel should have made a penalty-phase opening statement
to explain Kell's position. However, an opening statement was not the appropriate place to
explain Kell's position. "The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what
counsel intends to prove in his [or her] own case in chief by way of providing the jury an
overview of, and general familiarity with, the facts the party intends to prove. It is generally
accepted that an opening statement should not be argumentative.'" State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted), habeas corpus granted on other grounds,
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
Counsel made a penalty-phase closing argument in which he explained Kell's position
about why the jury should not sentence Kell to death (XIII5711-16; XIV5718-23). Thus,
counsel explained Kell's position at the appropriate time. Kell's claim that the Sixth
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Amendment required counsel to explain his position at an inappropriate time was frivolous,
and this Court should affirm the post-conviction court's sua sponte rejection of it.
15,

The post-conviction court correctly concluded that this Court's direct-appeal
holding that the victim-impact evidence did not affect the penalty-phase outcome
foreclosed Kell's claim that counsel should have objected to admitting it.
Kell claimed that his trial counsel failed to object to "highly prejudicial victim impact

testimony" (KIIR271 ).22 The post-conviction court granted summary judgment on this claim,
concluding in part that Kell could not prove prejudice because this Court already ruled on
direct appeal that it could see '"nopossibility'" that the victim impact evidence affected the
outcome. (KIIR625 n.4 (emphasis in post-conviction court's order)).
That ruling was correct. On direct appeal, this Court ruled that it could "see no
possibility that the jury's [penalty-phase] verdict would have been different" if the trial court
had excluded the victim impact evidence. Kell, 2002 UT 106 ^j 54. That holding foreclosed
the post-conviction court from finding Strickland prejudice: ^'reasonable probability" of a
more favorable outcome if counsel had objected to admitting and the trial court had excluded
the victim-impact evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.23
22

To the extent that Kell claimed his counsel wholly failed to challenge the
admission of victim-impact evidence, he misstates the facts. Kell challenged the
admissibility of victim-impact evidence both at trial (KIR836, 839, 1040; 18010, 8968-84)
and on appeal, Kell, 2002 UT 106 ffif 52-54. Counsel lost.
23

In this appeal, Kell persists that "without having testimony of the family and the
jury hearing the family's statements of loss and mourning, the jury may well have elected
to grant the Petitioner life without parole as opposed to the death penalty." Appellant's
Brief at 27. As demonstrated, this Court already reached the contrary conclusion on
Kell's direct appeal. Kell, 2002 UT 106 ^} 54. Further, speculating about what the jury
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16.

The post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment on KelPs claim
that his counsel called unspecified witnesses who gave unspecified testimony that
Kell now considers aggravating.
Kell claimed that his counsel called witnesses at the penalty phase "who gave

aggravation evidence rather than mitigation evidence" (KIIR271). The post-conviction court
granted summary judgment because Kell never identified "th[e] witnesses nor the parts of
their testimony that were aggravating" (KIIR625-26).
Kell has demonstrated no error in that determination. He argues only that the
testimony was part of the record. Appellant's Brief at 27. Yet again, Kell misses the point.
The post-conviction court did not bear the burden of scouring the record and trying to intuit
which testimony Kell now contends was more aggravating than mitigating. See Honie, 2002
UT 4 f 67. Rather, Kell bore the burden of identifying the aggravating testimony, the
authority or reasoning that should have led counsel to conclude not to present it, and how the
testimony led to a death sentence where the jury otherwise would have opted for life.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690, 694. He failed to do so even in his summary judgment
opposition. Based on that failure, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that Kell
could not support the claim. See Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462 (summary judgment motion
requires the non-moving party to make his "best showing" in support of his claims).

"may well have elected" to do is irrelevant. Kell had to demonstrate that trial counsel
could have kept the victim-impact evidence out, and that, without it, there would have
been a reasonable probability that the jury would have given Kell a sentence less than
death. Kimmelman, All U.S. at 389; Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285.
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17.

The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelFs challenge to appellate
counsel's representation.
Kell also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective. To succeed on that claim,

Kell would have had to prove that his counsel overlooked a claim that was obvious from the
record and that probably would have succeed. Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 48; Carter, 2001 UT
96 \ 48. With one exception, Kell failed to identify any specific appellate claim that he
contended his counsel had a constitutional duty to raise (KIIR271).
The post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment on KelPs generalized
challenge that appellate counsel was ineffective. A mere allegation that appellate counsel
was ineffective is insufficient as a matter of law to grant post-conviction relief. See Lafferty,
2007 UT 73 f1J48-5l.
Kell did claim that his appellate counsel should have argued that the transfer from
Nevada was illegal (id.). However, as explained in point B8? that claim is frivolous. Kell
had no constitutional right to counsel who would pursue frivolous claims. Cf. State v.
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1982) (holding that defense counsel's performance was
not deficient by failing to object to the admission of evidence he had already unsuccessfully
challenged in a suppression hearing), overruled on other grounds, State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483 (Utah 1986).24

24

For the first time in this Court, Kell also claims that his point II identifies two
claims that appellate counsel should have raised and argued. For the reasons argued in
point III above, Kell has not demonstrated either that counsel had an obligation to raise
the claims or that they probably would have succeeded.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, the court should affirm the post-conviction court's
order granting summary judgment in the State's favor and denying post-conviction relief.
DATED December 11, 2007.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

THOMAS B. BRUNKER
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorneys General
Appellee's counsel
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE
I certify that, on December 11, 2007, two true and correct copies of the foregoing
APPELLEE'S BRIEF were mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to appellant's
counsel, Mr. Aric Cramer, Cramer & Cramer, L.L.C., 90 East 100 South, Suite 201
St. George, Utah 84770; and Mr. Grant W.P. Morrison, Morrison & Morrison, 352 East 900
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

-58-

Addenda

Addendum A

§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - 1 0 4 . Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who
has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in
the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was
revoked in an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at
the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was
known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the ne^ly discovered material
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah
Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.
Laws 1996, c 235, § 4, eff. April 29, 1996.

§ 78~35a-105.

Burden of proof

The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996.

§ 7 8 - 3 5 a— 106. Preclusion of relief—Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal,
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Laws 1996, c 235, § 6, eff April 29, 1996.

(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for postconviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78~35a-101 et seq., PostConviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and Venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by
filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the
judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own
motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a
change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses.
(c) Contents of the Petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised
m subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall
state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered,
together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the
petitioner;
' (3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the
petitioner's claim to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of
the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results
of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time
for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous postconviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the Petition.
shall attach to the petition:

If available to the petitioner, the petitioner

(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or
sentence; and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign
and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who
sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the
normal course.
(g)(1) Summary Dismissal of Claims. The assigned judge shall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated

in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either
that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face.
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired
prior to the filing of the petition.
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading
error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall
return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of Petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes
that all or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail
upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or Other Response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under
these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have no1 been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon
the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed
for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No
further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to
be presented at the evidentiary hearing.

(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility
where the petitioner is confined.
(/) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be
allowed by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is
good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with
evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court
may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; Stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed
for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to
the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue
a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the
order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary and proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed
under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is
indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity
that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the
Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and Sections 78-7-36 through
78-7-43 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall
determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of
Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996.]
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Aric Cramer #54 60
Cramer & Cramer, L.L.C.
Smith Hyatt Building
845 South Main Street, Suite 23
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 299-9999
Facsimile: (801) 298-5161
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TROY MICHAEL KELL,
Petitioner,
AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

:

Case No. 030600171
Judge David L. Mower

.. COMES NO¥J Petitioner Troy Michael Kell by and through his
attorneys Grant W. P. Morrison and Aric Cramer, and petitions this
court for a writ of habeas corpus and/or post conviction relief in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101, et. seq., and Rules
65(b) and 65(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1

1. Petitioner is confined in the Utah State prison located in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah in the custody of the warden of the
Utah State Prison, Clint S. Friel.
2. Petitioner is confined pursuant to a conviction entered on
or about August 8, 1996, in the Sixth Judicial District Court for
Sanpete County, Case Number 941600213. Petitioner was found guilty
following a jury trial of Aggravated Murder, a Capital offense, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202. His sentence was death.
3.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Utah Supreme

Court, which has jurisdiction over capitol cases. The Utah Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction in State

v.

Kell,

2002 Ut 19,

originally filed February 8, 2002 but subsequently amended and
filed November 1, 2002.
4.

The Supreme Court of the United States denied Kell's

petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
5.

Troy Kell raised the following issues on appeal to the

Utah Supreme Court:
a.

The

trial

court

erred

by

denying

Kell

his

constitutional rights to a public trial, to the presumption of
innocence, and to equal protection of the law, by truing him in a
courtroom located inside the prison. This was the prison where the
purported crime had occurred.
b. The trial court violated Kell's constitutional rights
to a fair trial by denying him an impartial jury as a result of the

2

trial court's rulings on voir dire and challenges for cause.
c. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
on the theory of imperfect self-defense manslaughter.

Justice

Durham and Justice Howe were of the view that any evidence, even
the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant entitles a defendant
to an instruction on his theory of the case, and that the trial
judge should not make credibility determinations in criminal jury
trials- They concluded that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense manslaughter, but that
it was harmless error.

Within this argument, the jury was

specifically instructed to order its deliberations and not to
consider lesser included offenses unless it found the defendant
innocent of the greater offense. With regard to the manslaughter,
the instructions stated x'Do not deliberate or vote on the charge of
manslaughters lesser included offense, unless the State has failed
to prove either aggravated murder or murder." The Court found that
language to be improper.

Nevertheless, the Court held that the

instruction defining aggravated murder as including the absence of
emotional disturbance ensured that manslaughter was considered
before aggravated murder.
d.

The trial court erred by allowing jurors to view a

videotape of the homicide.
e. The trial court committed multiple evidentiary errors
which individual and cumulatively deprived Kell of a fair trial.
Included within this was the x'Dear Luther" letter, which the
3

defendant argued should not be admitted because of its prejudicial
nature.

Only portions of this letter were admitted.

Other issues

addressed, were, inter alia, statements allegedly made by Kell to
a guard post event, statements made by inmate Francisco Colon,
testimony and a small autopsy photograph.
f. The prosecution denied Kell his rights to due process
of law and protection under the eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by
making improper arguments to the jury.
prosecutorial misconduct issue.

This was raised as a

The Court acknowledged that,

"although perhaps ill-advised because of their personal nature (the
prosecutor had alluded to his mother having "substantial hardships'7
during

her

childhood,

yet

did

not

become

a

criminal) , the

prosecutor's statement did not constitute misconduct or plain
error.
g.

The trial court erred during the penalty phase by

refusing to allow the jury to consider mercy and sympathy as
mitigating factors.
h.

The victim impact evidence admitted in the penalty

phase and the statute which allows it, are unconstitutional.
i.
the

Section 76-5-202 of the Utah code, which describes

aggravating

factors

necessary

for

capital

murder,

is

unconstitutionally vague on its face.
j . The Utah death penalty statutes are unconstitutional
because they do not narrow the class of death-eligible murders,
thus encouraging the arbitrary and capricious application of the
4

death penalty.
k.

The capital sentencing proceedings were flawed.

1.

The imposition of the death penalty violated state

and federal constitutional double jeopardy provisions because Kell
had already been disciplined through the prisonfs disciplinary
proceedings. State

v. Kell,

61 P.2d at 1024-1025. This argument was

dispatched as frivolous.
6.

The Petitioner has not previously sought post-conviction

relief to challenge his conviction and sentence.
7.

Petitioner Troy Kell's conviction and sentence of death

were obtained in violation on his rights under the Constitution of
the United States, the Utah State Constitution, and the statutes
and laws of the State of Utah based upon the following facts, and
others to be developed after further investigation, discovery and
evidentiary hearing, as may be allowed under the funds available,
as set for below:
8. Kell's right to a fair and impartial public trial and his
right to due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
have been violated by being forced to stand trial inside the
Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF).

Although previously

raised as an issue on appeal, they were not effectively argued by
counsel as set forth below.
a.

Prior to trial, the question of trial security was

5

referred by Judge David L. Mower, the trial judge, to the presiding
judge of the District, Judge K. I. McKiff.

Judge McKiff, conducted

independent research, considered security issues raised by the
Department of Corrections, and made a determination that the trial
should be held at the CUCF, prior to holding a hearing on the issue
of trial security and place of trial.
Kell's

defense

attorney

sufficient

The court did not allow

notice

and

opportunity

to

prepare for the issues to be considered prior to the hearing,
thereby

denying

Kell

the

right

to

due process

and his

Sixth

Amendment rights to counsel.
b.

The trial court decision was not based upon fact, but

was based upon conclusions as to whether or not jurors would be
unduly prejudiced by a trial in a prison setting and the right of
petitioner

to be

tried

by

a Sanpete

County

jury.

Kell

had

previously moved for a change of venue from Sanpete County and did
not maintain

the right to be tried by a Sanpete County jury.

Kell's right to the presumption of innocence was compromised by the
prison trial since jurors would likely consider him to be more
dangerous

or

likely

guilty

due

to

the

place

of

trial.

Additionally, trial counsel did not argue or their arguments were
inadequate, that the prejudice to Kell would be greatly enhanced by
having the jury escorted in and out of all proceedings by a SWAT
team, that the attendance of SWAT team members in the courtroom,
whose very presence

was

intimidating by

the close cropped

or

skinhead appearance of most of the team members, especially if the
6

inference were drawn they were Kell's friends; that Kell was
required to testify while shackled, combined with the prison
setting ensured that Kell would not receive a fair trial.
c.

The trial court did not properly weigh and consider

the constitutional rights of the petitioner to a public trial in
making the decision to hold the trial in the prison, thereby
denying the petitioner his right to due process and his right to a
fair public trial under the provisions of Article I Section 12 of
the Utah State Constitution.

The decision of the court was based

primarily upon security issue concerns which should not have been
considered. The Daniels Court held that "...we also point out that
to hold a criminal trial in a courtroom located inside a prison or
other facility simply because a defendant is already incarcerated,
or because to do so would be more safe or convenient, would also be
error, absent adequate findings and compelling reasons'''.
at paragraph 26.

Daniels,

The public, although not barred from attending

the trial, were discouraged by having to attend the proceedings in
the prison.

Counsel was impermissibly ineffective in failing to

properly argue the preceding.
d.

The court, having concerns about the security during

trial, failed to consider a more reasonable alternative such as
moving the trial to a courtroom in another county, where there were
court rooms which are secure, spacious and available.

There are

secure court rooms in both Sevier and Utah counties which are

7

within reasonable distance of Sanpete County, where numerous trials
involving

inmate

witnesses

and

defendants

considered

serious

security risks have been held.
e.

The proceedings at the prison not only included the

jury trial of the guilt or innocence of Petitioner, but also the
jury determination of whether Kell was sentenced to life or death.
The fact that Kell's trial was held in the prison sent the implied
message to the jury that petitioner was extraordinarily dangerous
to the point that he could not be tried in a conventional court
room.

The combination of the charges and cumulative trial evidence

within the setting of an inherently dangerous environment of a
prison setting, led to the inexorable and entirely predictable
sentence of death.
9. The death qualification of the jury violated Kell's rights
guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 7,9,10 and 12
of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
a.

The jurors who were impaneled to hear the evidence,

determine the guilt or innocence of Kell, and to determine his
sentence were death qualified.
b.

The process of death qualification results in jurors

who are more prone to convict and to disregard the presumption of
innocence than those who are not.

This fact is borne out by

professional studies conducted by competent experts in the fields
of psychology and related fields.
8

10.

The trial court removed potential jurors, V.D. and R.F.,

for cause based upon the reluctance of the jurors to impose the
death penalty, thus violating Kell's rights guaranteed by the
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitutions, and Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
a.

The State moved to remove V.D. for cause based upon

her reservations concerning imposing the death penalty.

The

defense objected (R. 4404-05).
b.

The juror did not indicate that she would not impose

the death penalty, only that she would have difficulty in doing so
except in cases involving child molestation.

She did not indicate

that she would not impose the death penalty of that she could not
follow the instructions of the court. The juror indicated that she
did not have a conscientious objection to the death penalty.

The

juror indicated that she would listen to the evidence including
aggravating and mitigating evidence and vote for the appropriate
penalty and be fair (4393-4400) .
c.

The court granted the State's challenge for cause

based upon the fact that the juror may be uncomfortable or
reluctant to impose death rather than on a showing that the juror
could not and would not impose the death penalty upon petitioner,
regardless of the evidence ($. 4404-4406).
d.

The basis for removal of the juror for cause was

improper under the guidelines set forth in Witherspoon
9

v.

Illinois,

391 U.S. 510 (1968) .

The preceding issues were not effectively

raised by trial or appellate counsel.
e*

The State also moved to remove juror R. F. for cause

based upon her reluctance to impose the death penalty.

The defense

objected. (R. 4353-4354).
f.

R. F. stated that although she would have difficulty

in imposing the death penalty, she could do so in an extreme case.
She indicated that she would have to hear the evidence and then
under the appropriate circumstances she could possibly impose the
death penalty. (R. 4347) . The juror also indicated that she had no
conscientious objection to the death penalty. (R. 4349).
g. The trial court granted the prosecutions challenge to
cause upon the basis that there was a question about whether or not
the juror did have a conscientious objection to the death penalty.
(R. 4355).
h.

The basis for removal of the juror for cause was

improper under the guidelines set forth in Witherspoon

v.

Illinois,

391 U.S. 510 (1968) .
11.

The trial court improperly denied Kell' s challenges for

cause thus violating Kell's rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Sections 7 ,
State of Utah.

9, 10 and 12 of the Constitution of the

These arguments were either not raised by trial and

appellate counsel, or were not effectively raised.
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e.
expressed

Kell

bias

of

challenged
the juror.

for cause
The

trial

on

the basis

court

denied

of the
Kell's

challenge. (R. 4155-4156).
f.

Juror

D.S.

revealed

in

her

answers

to

the

questionnaire that she had been told about the crime scene by her
husband,

that

she was acquainted with

several of the State's

witnesses, that she knew too much about the case, that her husband
worked at the Central Utah Correctional Facility and had been
involved in cleaning up the crime scene, that she could not be fair
and that she had formed an opinion about the case.
g.

During voir dire questioning, D.S. indicated that she

had doubts about her ability to base her decisions on the evidence
in the case and whether or not she could separate what she had been
told about the case from the evidence presented in the courtroom
and that if she were Kell, she would not feel comfortable having a
juror with her state of mind hear the case.
h.

(R. 3723-3726) .

Kell challenged the juror based upon her voir dire

responses. The trial court denied his challenge for cause. (R.
3729)
i.

Juror S. M. indicated in her answers to the juror

questionaire that she was biased due to her belief that prisoner's
have too many rights and that she felt it would be a financial
hardship for her to serve.

S.M. indicated during voir dire that
12

she would have difficulty setting aside her own beliefs as to what
she thought the law ought to be and following the instructions on
the law given by the court* (R. 34 60-34 61) . She also felt that her
job

and

financial

commitments

would

make

it

difficult

to

concentrate on the trial (R. 3774-3775).
j.

Kell challenged S. M. for cause.

The trial court

denied Kell's challenge. (R. 3778).
k.

Juror C. L. indicated difficulty in serving due to

job concerns since he was one of two veterinarians in two counties,
that he knew several of the State's witnesses, and that he was
employed

as

Facility.

a

veterinarian

by

the

Central

Utah

Correctional

During voir dire examination, he indicated that he had

heard a lot about the case and that it would be interesting to see
if he could set aside what he had already heard

(R. 4105) .

He

expressed difficulty in committing to consider extreme emotional
stress of mental disturbance as a mitigating factor (R. 4116-4117).
1.

Kell challenged C. L. for cause based on his

unwillingness
disturbance

to

as

consider

extreme

a mitigating

emotional

factor.

stress

or

mental

The court denied

Kell's

challenge. Trial counsel failed adequately challenge C. L. for
cause

for his preconceived

beliefs

relating

to the guilt or

innocence of Kell, and his employment status as an employee of
CUCF, and his relationship with "several" of the State's witnesses.
m.
Kell's

The denial of Kell's challenges for cause violated

rights

guaranteed

by

the Sixth, Eighth
13

and

Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1,
Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
12.

Kell's right to a fair and impartial public trial were

violated by the denial of his Motion for a Change of Venue to a
county other than Sanpete County.

Kell had requested that the

trial be held in Salt Lake County due to heightened publicity and
potential difficulties in obtaining a fair trial in Sanpete County.
a.

Although there was initially state-wide publicity

regarding Kell's case, the publicity was much more intense in
Sanpete County, where the offense occurred.

The Central Utah

Correctional Facility is located in the city of Gunnison, located
in Sanpete County. The numerous law enforcement officers involved
in the case are residents of Sanpete County, as were most of the
witnesses called in the case. The chance of outside influence upon
the jury through media reports, knowledge or close association with
witnesses or other improper influences required the case to be
moved to a county with fewer risks for juror contamination.
b. Although Kell requested trial in Salt Lake County, he
did not object to trial in another county other than Sanpete.
c.

Although

the court determined

that there were

sufficient security concerns to require that the trial be held in
a prison facility and expressed concerns about whether such a trial
would result in a denial of Kell's constitutional rights to a fair
public trial, the court denied the Motion for a Change of Venue.
d.

Trial and Appellate counsel were derelict in failing
14

to raise this issue on appeal.
13.

The Petitioner's right to a fair trial, due process of

law and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by
the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the
Utah State Constitution by failure of the trial court and defense
counsel to give an adequate reasonable doubt instruction.
a.

The trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was

constitutionally

flawed

since

it

did

not

provide

sufficient

guidance to the burden of proof to the jurors.
b.

During

the penalty phase of the trial, defense

counsel did not object

to the submission

to the jury of the

standard of proof.
14.

Kell's right to a fair trial was fundamentally denied by

the admission, over objection, to the videotape. Although the Utah
Supreme

Court

appellate
having

has

ruled

that

counsel, was remiss

the

medical

the

videotape

in not arguing

examiner's

testimony,

was

admissible,

cumulative,

autopsy

after

report

and

numerous witnesses.
15.

Kell's right to a fair trial was violated by the improper

admission of evidence.
a.

The trial court allowed admission of a letter from

Kell called the "Dear Luther'7 letter.

Only partial portions of the

letter were admitted and defense counsel failed to effectively
present the entirety of the letter. Had the entirety of the letter
15

been introduced, not just selected "racist" parts, the jury would
have had an entirety different perception.
b.

The

autopsy report of the medical

examiner Dr.

Maureen Frikke, was admitted over the objection of defense counsel,
and the report was allowed to be sent back with the jury while it
deliberated.

This issue was not raised by appellate counsel, and

defense counsel was derelict in failing to raise this issue.
16.

Kell's conviction and death sentence were obtained as a

result of other incidences of ineffective trial counsel, which
occurred prior

to or during

the trial

of

the petitioner, as

failed

conduct

follows:
a.

Trial

counsel

to

effective

and

complete pretrial investigation and was not able to devote the
necessary time to Kell's case due to the rigorous demand's of trial
counsel's practice.
b.

Trial counsel filed a pretrial motion for a change of

venue from Sanpete County, State of Utah, to Salt Lake County, but
did not consider

other venues

closer

in proximity

to Sanpete

County.
c.
support

by

demographic

Trial counsel's motion for a change of venue was not
any

data

such

as

polls,

questionaires,

information to support the grounds

or

other

for moving the

trial.
d.

Trial counsel failed to adequately and effectively

brief and raise all of the issues regarding holding the trial in
16

the Central Utah Correctional facility, including obtaining data
from experts on the effect of the prison location upon jurors,
witnesses, and Kell's right to a public trial.
e. Trial counsel failed to seek interlocutory review of
the adverse ruling on the issue of venue and trial in the prison.
f. Trial counsel failed to adequately brief and research
pretrial motions which were filed.
g.

Trial counsel failed to file pretrial motions to

prevent the introduction of improper evidence.
h.

Trial counsel failed to properly investigate and

interview state's potential witnesses and to locate and secure
rebuttal witnesses and evidence.

Included in this were inmates

John Gallegos, James Setty and Doug Pierce who could have rebutted
the State's argument that there were procedures in place to handle
redress of inmate threats, and two black inmates who knew Kell and
could rebut the racist claim. Further, defense counsel failed to
secure the jackets of the State's witnesses, which could have
revealed potential credibility issues; at the very least the
claimed racist statements made by Kell purported heard by other
inmates were never requested by defense counsel.
i. Trial counsel failed to adequately advise Kell about
the necessity not to engage in conversation about the case with
custodial officers or other persons outside the presence of
counsel.
j.

Trial counsel failed to adequately review and make
17

objection to the improper original transfer of Kell under the
Interstate Compact Agreement.
k. Trial counsel failed to appropriately investigate and
illustrate prosecutorial misconduct relating to Francisco Colon,
whose testimony was devastating at trial, and proper investigation
would have shown Colon's testimony to be perjured.
1.

Trial counsel was

ineffective during the jury

selection process by failed to appropriately challenge jurors for
cause which forced Kell to expend his peremptory challenges to
remove those jurors.
m.

Potential juror Gerald Zabriskie indicated that he

would impose the death penalty if the State proved a vicious crime,
that

he

knew

several

of

the

State's

witnesses,

that

the

circumstances under which he would consider a penalty other than
the death penalty would be if the defendant were provoked, that it
was not an individual judgment as to whether the death penalty
should be imposed and that the death penalty was not imposed soon
enough after conviction. This juror was passed for cause by Kellfs
counsel despite issues of bias and unwillingness to make an
individual determination of the issues. (R. 3490-3498).
n.

Potential juror Helen H. Syme did not indicate that

she would hold the State to its burden of proof, indicating that
she "guessed" she would.

Symes indicated that she felt the

defendant should prove his innocence and when asked if defendant
did not take the stand if she would hold it against him said
18

initially that she did not know, then did not positively indicate
that she would render a decision based upon her own beliefs as to
what penalty would be appropriate.

Kell's counsel passed this

juror for cause despite the lack of total commitment to a decision
based upon her individual judgment.

(R. 3674-75), then used one of

Kell's peremptory challenges to excuse the juror.
o.
son worked

Potential juror Dan Brinkerhoff indicated that his
at the Central Utah Correctional

facility

and was

working at the time of the homicide and that he believed the death
penalty

was

appropriate

in every

case

of

intentional murder,

although he did later indicate that he would not "automatically"
impose the death penalty in every case of intentional homicide.
Kell's counsel did not challenge this juror for cause

(R.3796-

3801), then used one of Kell's peremptories to excuse the juror.
p.
would

Potential juror Earl J. Brewer indicated that he

impose the death penalty

premeditated.

in cases where

the murder was

When asked again he indicated that if it was planned

there were no circumstances under which he would not impose death.
Although there might be circumstances where he would

consider

mitigating evidence, the tenor of his responses was that he would
impose

the

premeditated.

death

penalty

cases

where

the

penalty

was

The juror also indicated that he had a brother who

worked at the prison.
that

in

relationship

There was no inquiry as to whether or not

would

cause

the

juror

to

favor

the

prison

employees who were witnesses in the case or whether he could give
19

equal consideration to those who may testify adversely.

Kell f s

counsel did not challenge for cause (R. 3839-43) and counsel used
one of Kell's peremptory challenges to remove the juror.
q.

Potential juror Elaine S. Redmond indicated that she

thought Kell should prove his innocence and that Ross Blackham, one
of the prosecutors, was her divorce attorney.

During the voir

dire, prosecutor Blackham addressed the juror by her first name,
Elaine,

potentially

indicating

acquaintance with the juror.
cause

(R.

4220-24)

and

he

had

more

than

a

casual

Kell's counsel did not challenge for

defense

counsel

used

one

of

Kell's

peremptory challenges to remove her.
r.

Kell's trial counsel failed to object to improper

opening statements made by the prosecution, and this issue was not
raised on appeal.
s.

Trail counsel failed to adequately advise Kell as to

whether or not Kell should testify in the guilt/innocence phase of
the trial where he would be subject to cross examination.
t.

Trial

counsel

failed

to have bench

conferences

transcribed to preserve the record of the proceedings, even though
this was a death penalty case.
17.

Kell's conviction and death sentence were obtained as a

result of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his
rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Sections 7, 9
and 12 of the Utah State Constitution which occurred during the
20

penalty phase of the trial.
a.

Trial counsel did not object to the improper opening

statement of the prosecutor*
b.

Trial counsel did not make an opening

statement

informing the jury of Kell f s position.
c.

Trial counsel did not object to the presentation of

highly prejudicial victim impact testimony.
d.

Trial

counsel

presented

witnesses

who

were

detrimental to Kell and who gave aggravation evidence rather than
mitigation evidence.
e.

Trial counsel did not object to improper closing

arguments from the prosecution.
18.

Kell f s Appellate counsel was ineffective.
a.

Keil f s conviction and death sentence were upon on

appeal as a result of ineffective counsel.
b.

Appellate counsel failed to adequately brief and

raise relevant issues on appeal, as reflected herein.
c.

Appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of the

legality of Kell's transfer from Nevada to Utah.
d.

Absent

the

errors

and

omissions

of

trial

and

appellate counsel, there is a reasonable likelihood that petitioner
would

not

have

been

convicted

of

aggravated

murder,

and

a

reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been sentenced
to death.
Wherefore, the petitioner prays as follows:
21

1.

That the Court

issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus or as

otherwise specified in the Post Conviction Remedies Act, and have
the petitioner brought before this Court in order to be discharged
from his unconstitutional confinement and restrain, and relieved on
his unconstitutional sentence of death.
2.

Conduct a hearing wherein proof may be offered in support

of the allegations of this petition.
3.

For other such further relief as may be appropriate.

DATED this 1st day of August, 2005.
MORRISON 6c MORRISON, L.C.

Grant W. P. Morrison
Aric Cramer
Attorneys for Troy M. Kell

Certificate of Service
This is to certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, to:
Thomas B. Brunker, Esq.
Christopher D. Ballard, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
on the 1st day of August, 2005.
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Grant W.P. Morrison #3666
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
Troy Michael Kell
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 359-7999
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774
Aric Cramer #5460
Cramer & Cramer, L.L.C.
Smith Hyatt Building
845 South Main Street, Suite 23
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 299-9999
Facsimile: (801) 298-5161
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TROY MICHAEL KELL,
Petitioner,

:

:

ADDITION TO
AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS

:

Case No. 030600171
Judge David L. Mower

VS.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

COMES NOW Petitioner Troy Michael Kell by and through his
attorneys Grant W. P. Morrison and Aric Cramer, and provides page
11 to the previously submitted Amended Petition for Post Conviction
Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus.
left out of the filing.
1

This page was inadvertently

Dated this 8th day of August, 2005.

MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.

'Grant W. P. Morrison
Aric Cramer
Attorneys for Troy M. Kell

Certificate of Service
This is to certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, to:
Thomas B. Brunker, Esq.
Christopher D. Ballard, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
on the 8th day of August, 2005.
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(a) Juror M.C. stated

that he would

impose

the

penalty in any case where intentional homicide was proven.
3393)•

death
(R.

Although he later indicated that he would listen to the

evidence

and

follow

the

instruction

(R.

3400) , he

then

later

reinstated his intent to impose the death penalty for intentional
or knowing murder
eye" is correct

(R. 3401) and that the concept of an "eye for an

(R. 3402-3403) .

(b) Defense counsel challenged for cause, but the trial
court denied the challenge, (R. 3408) .
(c)

Juror

N.B.

revealed

that

he

had

known

the

head

prosecutor for over twenty-one years, and that he knew him to be a
good man.

Further, he stated that he did not know the

defense

counsel and that he would give the prosecutor more credence than he
would

afford

defense

counsel

and

that

in

a

close

case

his

friendship with prosecutor Ross Blackham would cause him to side
with the prosecution.

(R. 4189)

(d) N. B. also indicated that he had heard a lot about
the case and that he was not sure he could set aside what he had
heard.

(R. 4141).
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Addendum C

FJLEB
SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH

2087 JRN 2 3 fifl 9 OH
;> SANPETE COUNTY CLERK
Ml^Zyu^d
DEPUTY
DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH
160 NORTH MAIN, P.O. Box 100
MANTI, UTAH 84642
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135

TROY MICHAEL KELL,
Petitioner,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 030600171

Respondent.

Assigned Judge: D A V I D L. M O W E R

This case is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial
Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and
all applicable statutory provisions. Oral argument was scheduled for November 22, 2006, but did
not take place. After a Motion to Continue that hearing was denied, the parties stipulated to
submit the Motion based on the written memoranda. The Court now issues this ruling granting
Respondent's Motion.
Procedural History
Following a jury trial held in the Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) in 1996,
Petitioner was found guilty of aggravated murder in the death of Lonnie Blackmon. Petitioner
was subsequently sentenced to death by the jury at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the
trial.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171. Page -2Petitioner's conviction and sentence were automatically reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court. On November 11, 2002, the Supreme Court issued a decision affirming Petitioner's
conviction and sentence. See State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019 (Utah 2002).
A Preliminary Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed by the Petitioner on May 16,
2003. On August 1, 2005, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his conviction and death sentence.
On December 2, 2005, Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary
Judgment. Petitioner's opposition was filed on March 31, 2006. Respondent's reply was filed on
June 20, 2006. Request to Submit for Decision was filed on June 29, 2006.
Summary of the Parties' Arguments
Petitioner makes the following claims that challenge his conviction and sentence:
a.

issues related to the jury selection process, such as death qualification and errors
committed by the trial court judge concerning excusals and challenges for cause;

b.

issues related to the fairness of the trial proceedings such as improper instructions
and errors in admitting evidence;

c.

ineffective assistance of trial counsel such as failure to conduct a complete
pretrial investigation or to devote the necessary time to the case, failure to
consider other places for change of venue, failure to support the motion for
change of venue with data, polls, etc., failure to brief and raise issues related to

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171. Page -3whether the trial should be held in the CUCF, failure to seek interlocutory review
of the trial court's ruling on the venue issue, failure to adequately brief and
research pretrial motions, failure to properly investigate and interview the State's
potential witnesses, failure to tell the Petitioner not to talk to custodial officers,
failure to object to the improper original transfer of Petitioner under the Interstate
Compact Agreement, failure to properly investigate and illustrate prosecutorial
misconduct, failure to appropriately challenge jurors during jury selection, failure
to object to improper opening statements, failure to advise Petitioner that if he
testified he would be subject to cross-examination, and failure to have the bench
conferences during the trial recorded;
d.

ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase of the trial such as
failure to object to improper opening statements of the prosecutor, failure to make
an opening statement, failure to object to prejudicial victim impact evidence,
improperly calling witnesses that provided aggravating evidence, and failure to
object to improper closing arguments by the prosecutor; and

e.

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel such as failure to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel issues, failure to adequately brief and raise relevant
issues on appeal, and failure to raise the issue of the legality of Petitioner's
transfer from the State of Nevada to the State of Utah.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171, Page -4Respondent is seeking summary judgment arguing that (1) some claims are procedurally
barred because they were raised and rejected on appeal; (2) some claims are barred because they
could have been raised on appeal but were not; (3) some claims are not properly supported with
facts sufficient to entitle Petitioner to post-conviction relief.
Analysis1
Section 1. Claims Previously Raised and Rejected on Direct Appeal
A petition for post-conviction relief is not "a substitute for direct appellate review;" it
only "collaterally attacks a conviction and/or a sentence." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613
(Utah 1994). Thus, "[ijssues raised and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a sentence
cannot properly be raised again in a [post-conviction petition] and should be dismissed as an
abuse of the writ without a ruling on the merits." Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a106(l)(b).
This general rule is subject to several exceptions. Claims that fall under this rule would
not be dismissed if "there has been an intervening change of controlling authority ... , new
evidence has become available, or ... [the Utah Supreme Court's] prior decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 31 P.3d
543, 546410 (Utah 2001).

The Court will follow Respondent's numbering of the claims raised in the Amended Petition i.e. the first
claim raised by the Petitioner m paragraph 8 will be referred to as claim 8 rather than claim 1, etc.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171, Page -5All of the following claims were previously raised and rejected on direct appeal:
1.

claim 8 alleging that "the trial court erred by denying [Petitioner] his
constitutional rights to a public trial, to the presumption of, and to equal
protection of the law[ ] by trying him in a courtroom located inside [CUCF]."
Amended Petition at 2. See Kell at 1026-27, ffijl 1-16;

2.

claim 10 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's fair trial rights by
granting the prosecutor's request to remove two potential jurors for cause based
upon their reluctance to impose a sentence of death, see Id. at 1027-28, ^[17-20;

3.

claim 11 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's rights to fair trial by
improperly denying his challenges for cause, see Id. at 1028, ^21;

4.

claim 14 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's rights to fair trial by
allowing the jury to view a videotape of the homicide, see Id. at 1030-31, lft[2931; and

5.

claim 15(b) alleging that Petitioner's rights to fair trial were violated because his
trial counsel failed to challenge the admission of the autopsy report, and his
appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on appeal. See Id. at 1031-32, ^[37.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the exceptions described above apply here.
Therefore, these claims are procedurally barred under Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-35a106(l)(b).

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171, Page -6With respect to several of these claims, the Petitioner suggests that they were not
effectively raised and argued by counsel and, therefore, his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel on appeal was violated. See Amended Petition at 5, 10, 15, and
16.
The ineffective assistance of counsel exception does not apply to claims that have been
raised on direct appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2). A contrary rule would allow an
issue already disposed of on direct appeal to be relitigated "under a different guise." Gardner at
615. Petitioner should not be allowed to do that.
For these reasons, Petitioner's claims 8, 10, 11, 14, and 15(b) are dismissed.
Section 2. Claims Petitioner Could Have Raised on Appeal But Did Not
Claims that could and should have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised for the
first time in a post-conviction petition. See Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 630, ^[6 (Utah 2001).
The exception is where a petitioner can demonstrate that "the failure to raise [these issues] was
due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2).
There are two claims that fall under this category: claim 9 and claim 13(a). Claim 9
alleges that the "process of death qualification results in jurors who are more prone to convict
and to disregard the presumption of innocence than those who are not." Amended Petition at 8.
Claim 13(a) alleges that "the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally
flawed since it did not provide sufficient guidance to the burden of proof to the jurors." Id. at 15.
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before the Utah Supreme Court, but he chose not to do so. Petitioner has not shown that his
failure to raise these claims was due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
It follows that claims 9 and 13(a) are barred by Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-35a-106(2). These claims are dismissed.
Section 3. Claims for which Respondent has Requested Summary Judgment and No
Objection Was Raised in Petitioner's Opposing Memorandum
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment is
"to eliminate the time, trouble^] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Holbrook Co. v. Adams,
542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).
When a moving party satisfies his burden of producing sufficient evidence, the opposing
party has his own burden to meet. He must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial;" mere allegations or denials of the pleadings are not sufficient. Utah R.
Civ. P., Rule 56(e). If the party does not respond with specific facts, "[s]ummary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against... [him]." TS1 Partnership v. Alfred, 877 P.2d 156, 158
(UtahApp. 1994).
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Procedure. Petitioner is required to set forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form
the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief." If necessary, the petitioner should "attach to the
petition ... affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations." Id. Rule
65C(d)(l).
Petitioner chose not to respond to the Respondent's request for summary judgment on the
portion of claim 16(e) which asserts that Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
seek interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to try Petitioner at the CUCF. See
Amended Petition at 17.
Petitioner has failed to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Consistent with Rule 56, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on that portion of
claim 16(e).
Section 4. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel at the Guilt or Innocence
Phase
Subsection 1. Standard of Review
To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each prong of the test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984). Under this test, Petitioner is required to
show that (1) counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687; see also Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171, Page -9(Utah 1988); State v. Geaiy, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). The Court may look at those
requirements in any order and if "it is easier to dispose of ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed." Id. at 697.
Further, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made errors so serious that [he]
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at
687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by whether counsel's representation was
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688.
There is a strong presumption that counsel's representation "falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. This presumption is partially based on the idea
that counsel's actions are determined in many cases by the choices of the defendant and the
information supplied by the defendant. Id. at 691.
Therefore, in evaluating counsel's performance, the Court must make "every effort... to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at
689. Moreover, the assessment of counsel's performance cannot be based upon "what is prudent
or appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled." United States v. Cronic, 466
US 648, 665 n.38(1984).
Even if ineffectiveness is proven, prejudice must also be shown. To show prejudice,
petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability [such that it undermines
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proceeding would have been different2." Id. at 694.
Subsection 2. Claim 13fb)
In claim 13(b), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to provide an
adequate reasonable doubt instruction. In the context of giving instructions, trial counsel
performs deficiently if "the instructions, taken as a whole, [do not] correctly communicate the
principle of reasonable doubt." State v. Cruz, 122 P.3d 543, 550, P21(Utah 2005), citing In re
Winship, 397 US 358, 364 (1970). This means that the jury must be instructed that every fact
necessary to constitute a crime must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Id.
Petitioner does not describe how the reasonable doubt instruction was inadequate. He
asserts that it was inadequate without giving any further facts or analysis.
Petitioner is required under Rules 65C(d)(l) and 56(e) to present facts and support them
with necessary affidavits, copies of record, or other evidence. Petitioner did not do that.
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning trial counsel's effectiveness with
respect to reasonable doubt instmction. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
on claim 13(b).
Subsection 3. Claim 15(a)

This showing is greater than simply demonstrating "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding," but less than demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered
the outcome m the case." Strickland at 693.
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the entire "Dear Luther" letter. Petitioner claims that if "the entirety of the letter been introduced,
not just selected 'racist' parts, the jury would have had an entire[l]y different perception."
Amended Petition at 15-16. In response to the State, Petitioner says that the Court "must assume
that the letter would have assisted [him]" because the Court must look at all the facts in light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Mem. in Opp. at 42. Petitioner does not cite to any
authority supporting this argument.
Petitioner's argument misstates the law. The Court is only required to believe the
evidence and the facts presented by the non-moving party, which are properly supported by
affidavits and other documents. See Anderson v. American Liberty Lobby, Inc., All US 242, 255
(1986); Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 65C(d)(l) and Rule 56(e). The Court does not have to assume that
the Petitioner's legal conclusions are correct.
It appears that claim 15(a) is not properly supported by evidence. Respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment on claim 15(a) is granted.
Subsection 4. Claim 16(a)
Here, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to devote sufficient time to the case
and failed to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation. However, he does not indicate how these
failings have prejudiced his case. He also does not give specific examples of deficiencies during
the pretrial investigation. Petitioner's only argument is that his allegation alone "is enough
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This is again an incorrect statement of the law. As discussed in Subsection 3, Petitioner is
required to produce facts and other evidence in support of his claim to show that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that precludes entry of summary judgment. Because Petitioner has
failed to do that, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on claim 16(a) is granted.
Subsection 5. Claims 16(b) and (c)
Petitioner asserts in claim 16(b) that his trial counsel failed to consider other possible
venue sites for the trial other than Salt Lake City. He says that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to adequately support the motion for change of venue with "data such as polls,
questionaires [sic], or other demographic information to support the grounds for moving the
trial." Amended Petition at 16. In his opposing memorandum, Petitioner argues that counsel
should have been aware during voir dire that an impartial jury could not be selected and that
"had a sufficient amount of work been done, the venue of the trial as well as the CUCF matter
would have been concluded elsewhere." Mem. in Opp. at 39.
These statements are re-assertions of the original claims brought by the Petitioner in his
post-conviction petition. They do not contain sufficient facts to form a claim for relief under
Rule 65C(c)(3). Moreover, even if the trial counsel's performance was deficient, Petitioner has
failed to submit evidence demonstrating that his case was prejudiced by it. Petitioner did not
show that his counsel's ineffective perfomiance undermined his constitutional right to a fair trial
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Since Petitioner did not submit facts that support his allegations, Respondent is entitled
to summary judgment on claims 16(b) and (c).
Subsection 6. Claim 16fd)
In claim 16(d), Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to adequately "brief and raise all
of the issues regarding holding the trial in the Central Utah Correctional Facility, including
obtaining data from experts on the effect of the prison location upon jurors, witnesses, and
[Petitioner's] right to a public trial." Amended Petition at 16-17. Petitioner furnishes no facts
indicating what type of evidence trial counsel should have obtained and presented to the trial
court or what specific expert testimony would have provided concerning the effect of the prison
location on jurors and witnesses.
In his opposing memorandum, Petitioner states that prior counsel has indicated that
providing the trial court with expert evidence, as well as "other court holdings," would have
resulted in the trial not being held at the CUCF.
Again, Petitioner does not submit specific facts to support his claim. Respondent,
therefore, is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(d).

Subsection 7. Claim 16fe)
Claim 16(e) alleges failure of trial counsel "to seek interlocutory review of the adverse
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his claim with the recent case of State v. Stubbs, 123 P.3d 407 (Utah 2005). Mem. in Opp. at 38.
In Stubbs, the Utah Supreme Court encouraged defendants to bring up questions of venue on
interlocutory appeal prior to going to trial3. At 410, TflO, n.3.
Even in light of the Stubbs decision, Petitioner still has to satisfy the Strickland standard.
Strickland mandates "that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time." At 689. Applying the Supreme Court's dictum in Stubbs to
evaluate trial counsel's performance in Petitioner's case would be doing precisely what
Strickland instructs should not be done, namely, relying on hindsight.
Petitioner provides no additional evidence or argument demonstrating that his trial
counsel was ineffective in choosing not to seek interlocutory review of the denial of the motion
to change venue. Thus, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(e).

Subsection 8. Claims 16(f) and (g)
In claim 16(f), Petitioner asserts that "trial counsel failed to adequately brief and research
pretrial motions which were filed." Amended Petition at 17. Claim 16(g) alleges that "trial

The precise language from Stubbs is, "[although most cases have been presented to us following a
conviction, we encourage the defendants to raise venue questions on interlocutory appeal This both ensures fairness at
trial and discourages the defendants fiom abusing the appeals process by waiting until the trial is over to resolve this
issue." At 410, If 10, n3
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Petitioner says that under Rule 65C(c)(3) he is only required to state in concise terms the
facts that form the basis of his claim; and he is not obligated to support his claims with evidence
or affidavits. See Mem. in Opp. at 19. He further says that "[cjounsel has again shown that
pretrial motions were either not done correctly, or were completely skipped ... [and that this]
sufficiently [lays] the issue out with enough particularity to pass summary judgment and
dismissal." Id. at 43.
Petitioner does not tell the Court which pre-trial motions were inadequately briefed. He
also does not explain what evidence should have been the subject of a motion to suppress.
Petitioner's claims are again not properly supported with facts as required by Rules
65C(d)(l) and 56(e). Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claims 16(f) and
(g).
Subsection 9. Claim 16(h)
In claim 16(h), Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
sufficiently investigate, interview, or secure potential witnesses. Petitioner says that the
testimony of those witnesses would show that there were no effective procedures in prison to
handle inmate threats.
Claim 16(h) also alleges failure of counsel to secure the "jackets" of the State's
witnesses, which could have revealed potential credibility issues, and to obtain racist statements
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"has sufficiently claimed the facts with enough particularity that evidence should be taken. This
allegation is sufficient to pass summary judgment and dismissal." Mem. in Opp. at 44.
The State argued at the trial that there were procedures in prison for addressing inmate
threats. Petitioner identifies three potential witnesses whom trial counsel should have
interviewed and whose testimony could have rebutted that argument.
Even if the trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable here, Petitioner has
not provided any evidence demonstrating prejudice.
Petitioner also fails to support the rest of claim 16(h) with specific facts. He does not
identify the two black witnesses who knew the Petitioner and could have rebutted the "racist
claim." He does not tell what testimony they would have provided. He also does not specify
what potential impeachment evidence would have been discovered if the trial counsel secured
the "jackets" of the State's witnesses.
In its motion for summary judgment, Respondent "identified] the portions of the
pleadings or supporting documents which it believes demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue
of material fact." TS 1 Partnership at 158. Petitioner was required under Rule 56(e) to respond
with specific facts. Petitioner did not do it. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary
judgment on claim 16(h).
Subsection 10. Claim 16(1)
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conversations with custodial officers or other persons outside of counsel's presence. See
Amended Petition at 17. Petitioner does not describe any specific conversations of that nature.
Respondent refers to a specific incident where Petitioner commented to the guards just prior to
being escorted into the courtroom on the day he made an unsworn statement to jurors during the
penalty phase. The guards testified they heard Petitioner say he was going to feign remorse.
Petitioner argues that under the state and federal constitutions, trial counsel had a duty to
warn him about the "adversary nature of the proceedings." Mem. in Opp. at 45. The State replies
that Petitioner does not specify the information of which his trial counsel should have been
aware and which should have triggered a duty to warn. Mem. in Supp. at 78.
Even if trial counsel was ineffective in failing to warn, Petitioner did not demonstrate
prejudice. Petitioner did not show that the jury's verdict would have probably been different if
the guards did not testify about Petitioner's comments. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to
summary judgment on claim 16(i).
Subsection 11, Claim 16fj)
In claim 16(j), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
"adequately review and make objection to the improper original transfer of [Petitioner] under the
Interstate Compact Agreement." Amended Petition at 17-18. Petitioner says that the illegal
transfer resulted in a due process violation because prison staff purposely placed him in a "kill
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Petitioner's due process argument rests upon his self-defense claim. This claim was
litigated in Petitioner's direct appeal and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. See Kelt at 102829, ^[22-25. Therefore, the Petitioner did not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
failure to raise this due process issue. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim
16©.
Subsection 12. Claim 16fk)
Claim 16(k) alleges trial counsel failed to properly investigate and illustrate prosecutorial
misconduct relating to the testimony of Francisco Colon, one of the prosecution's key witnesses
against Petitioner at trial. Petitioner argues that Francisco Colon perjured himself at trial.
Respondent replies that Petitioner "alleges insufficient facts to show that Colon perjured
himself, that the prosecutor knew this, or that there is any reasonable likelihood that the perjured
testimony could have affected the outcome." Mem. in Supp. at 80.
Petitioner denies the facts raised in Respondent's memorandum, but again fails to support
his claim with specific facts. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim
16(k).
Subsection 13. Claim 16(D-(q)
In claims 16(l)-(q), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
properly challenge five prospective jurors for cause. This subsequently forced him to expend
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Respondent argues that the record does not demonstrate sufficient bias on the part of
these prospective jurors "to overcome the presumption that counsel made a legitimate choice not
to challenge these jurors for cause." Mem. in Supp. at 45. In response, Petitioner denies the
additional facts presented in Respondent's memorandum and asks for an evidentiary hearing to
allow him to challenge trial counsel and to show that one or more biased jurors decided his case.
See Mem. in Opp. at 37.
The jury selection process is characterized as "highly subjective, judgmental, and
intuitive." State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 99, ^[20 (Utah 2000). Because of the nature of the jury
selection process, counsel's choice is presumed to be conscious and strategic and to constitute
effective assistance unless shown otherwise. Id. In order to overcome this presumption,
Petitioner must show either (1) that failure to remove a juror was not a product of conscious
choice because counsel was inattentive or indifferent; or (2) that a prospective juror expressed a
very strong bias; or (3) that there is no plausible justification for counsel's choice. Id. at 100,
125.
Petitioner did not demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact with respect to any of
these factors.
The facts show that trial counsel was attentive and engaged during the jury selection
process. He asked specific questions concerning prospective jurors' views on the death penalty,
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Petitioner if he chose not to testify, and whether they could follow the law as instructed by the
court.
Petitioner says that the prospective jurors he identified in his claim were biased.
However, he did not show that their bias was "strong and unequivocal." Id.
Finally, Petitioner did not submit any evidence demonstrating that counsel's decision not
to challenge these jurors was not plausibly justifiable.
Even if trial counsel was, nevertheless, ineffective, Petitioner again did not produce any
facts showing prejudice. Absent such a showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that any genuine
issue exists with respect to trial counsel's effectiveness. See TS 1 Partnership at 158.
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on claims 16(l)-(q) is granted.
Subsection 14. Claim 16(r)
Here, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel "should have objected to the specific statements
in the prosecutor's opening that were argumentative and not merely to show the jury what
evidence would be submitted." Mem. in Opp. at 48. Petitioner does not identify the statements
and does not show the connection between lack of objection and the outcome of the trial.
Again Petitioner has failed to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a genuine
issue of material fact exists concerning trial counsel's effectiveness with respect to the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(r).
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In claim 16(s), Petitioner asserts that "trial counsel failed to adequately advise [him] as to
whether or not [he] should testify in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial where he would be
subject to cross-examination." Amended Petition at 20. Petitioner further says that his trial
counsel "did not specifically help or warn Petitioner about the dangers of testifying in the guilt
phase. A non-testifying opportunity would have brought a different result." Mem. in Opp. at 49.
These statements are allegations. In support of these allegations, Petitioner should have
provided specific facts but he failed to do so. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on
claim 16(s).
Subsection 16. Claim 16ft)
Claim 16(t) alleges that trial counsel "failed to have bench conferences transcribed to
preserve the record of the proceedings, even though this was a death penalty case." Amended
Petition at 20. Petitioner explains that defense attorneys are trained to have all the bench
conferences in capital cases recorded. Mem. in Opp. at 49.
Here, again, Petitioner did not show prejudice by specific facts. It is not clear how
recordings of the bench conferences would have produced a different outcome for the Petitioner.
Without this showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is a genuine issues with respect to
trial counsel's ineffective assistance. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on
claim 16(t).
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Subsection 1. Claim 17(a)
In claim 17(a), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
the improper opening statement of the prosecutor. Petitioner also states that trial "counsel should
have objected to the specific statements in the prosecutor's opening that were argumentative and
not merely to show the jury what evidence would be submitted." Mem. in Opp. at 48.
Petitioner does not identify the argumentative statements and does not show how
counsel's objection would have affected the outcome of the trial. Petitioner did not present
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Respondent is
entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(a).
Subsection 2. Claim 17(b)
Petitioner argues in claim 17(b) that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to "make
an opening statement informing the jury of [Petitioner's] position." Amended Petition at 21.
Respondent has not requested summary judgment on this claim; perhaps this was an oversight. In
any event, Petitioner's response is silent as to this claim.
However, Petitioner did not show that the outcome of the penalty phase would have
probably been different if his counsel made a more effective opening statement. On this ground,
Respondent would be entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(b).
Subsection 3. Claim 17(c)
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presentation of highly prejudicial victim impact testimony." Id. Petitioner argues that because the
state of the law is always in flux, objections should routinely be made in order to preserve
defendant's rights.
Even if trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the victim impact evidence,
Petitioner has not shown that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different but for
trial counsel's alleged deficiency4. Because Petitioner has not shown prejudice, Respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment on claim 17(c) is granted.
Subsection 4. Claim 17(d)
In claim 17(d), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in "presenting]
witnesses who were detrimental to [Petitioner] and who gave aggravation evidence rather than
mitigation evidence." Amended Petition at 21. Petitioner further states that trial counsel "should
have had sufficient understanding and knowledge of what his witnesses would testify to in the
penalty phase part of the trial, and not put on evidence that is harmful to his client." Mem. in
Opp. at 50-51.
Petitioner does not identify these witnesses nor the parts of their testimony that were

Petitioner also cannot prove prejudice On dn ect appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the victim impact
evidence m this case was moderate in tone, descriptive of the family's loss and mourning but not militant or angry, and
contained no effort to pressure the jury to impose the death penalty Absent its pi esence m the penalty phase, we see no
possibility that the jury's verdict would have been different, based as it clearly was on the acts and character of the
defendant." Kell at 1036, ^[54.
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is entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(d).
Subsection 5. Claim 17fe)
In claim 17(e), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to "object to improper closing
arguments from the prosecution." Amended Petition at 21. Petitioner argues that prosecutorial
misconduct should always draw an objection, and that by not objecting his counsel failed to
preserve an issue for appeal.
Petitioner does not identify the improper arguments presented by the prosecutor.
Petitioner also did not demonstrate with reasonable probability how a proper objection would
have changed the outcome of the penalty phase. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact
as to the prejudicial effect of counsel's errors. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary
judgment on claim 17(e).
VI. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Subsection 1. Standard of Review
Effective assistance of appellate counsel is a right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387, 396 (1985). Ineffectiveness of
appellate counsel is judged under the same standard as ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See Smith
v. Robbins, 528 US 259, 285 (2000); Bruner v Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). This
standard requires Petitioner to "first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in
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showing, he then has the burden of demonstrating prejudice.'Td. To demonstrate prejudice,
Petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unreasonable failure to
file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal." Id.
Appellate counsel is not required to raise every possible issue on appeal. See Carter v.
Galetka at 639, ^48. Only failure to raise a "dead-bang winner" claim is considered to be
deficient performance. See Id.; see also Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392-93, 395 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Tenth Circuit initially defined a claim as a "dead-bang winner" if it "was obvious
from the trial record ... and ... would have resulted in a reversal on appeal." Cook at 395
(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not adopt this language. Rather, the
Carter Court adopted language from the Banks decision which defined "dead-bang winner" "as
an 'issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in
reversal on appeal.'" Carter at 640, ^[48 (emphasis added), citing Banks at 1515 n.13.
Therefore, in order for the petitioner to avoid summary judgment on any claims that
allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he must demonstrate that there is a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to the following elements. First, appellate counsel's failure to
raise an issue which was obvious from the trial record. Second, the issue must be one which
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal.
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Here, Petitioner argues that the appeal of his conviction and death sentence was affirmed
"as a result of ineffective counsel." Amended Petition at 21. This general allegation identifies no
specific issue that his counsel failed to raise and which would have probably resulted in reversal
on appeal.
Petitioner's Memorandum hi Opposition also contains a general allegation that his
"conviction and sentence were obtained and his appeal was rejected because of ineffective
assistance both at the trial and the appellate level." At 52. Because Petitioner has failed to
identify a specific issue or issues, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 18(a).
Subsection 3. Claim 18(b)
In claim 18(b), Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to
"adequately brief and raise relevant issues on appeal."Amended Petition at 21. Respondent did
not request summary judgment on this claim; perhaps this was an oversight.
However, even if the issues raised in Petitioner's post-conviction petition were obvious
from the trial record and should have been raised or more adequately briefed on appeal,
Petitioner fails to address how these issues would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Therefore,
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 18(b).
Subsection 4. Claim 18(c)
Petitioner asserts in claim 18(c) that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing "to raise
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Petitioner argues that an illegal transfer violated his due process rights.
The decision on this claim is the same as on claim 16(j). Petitioner's due process
argument relies on his self-defense claim, which was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court on
appeal. See Kell at 1028-29,ffl[22-25.Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on
claim 18(c).
Subsection 5. Claim 18(d)
In claim 18(d), Petitioner concludes that "[ajbsent the errors and omissions of trial and
appellate counsel, there is a reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been convicted
of aggravated murder, and a reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been sentenced
to death." Amended Petition at 21. Although this statement is under the heading "Kell's
Appellate counsel was ineffective" in Petitioner's post-conviction petition, it is clearly not an
assertion of a claim for relief but a legal conclusion.
Conclusion
In his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner raises several claims and
sub-claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Petitioner argues that these
claims demonstrate that his conviction is unconstitutional. Respondent moved for summary
judgment on all of the Petitioner's claims. After considering all of the issues raised, the Court
grants Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment on claims 8, 9, 10,
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trial counsel in failing to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to try Petitioner at
the CUCF, claims 17(a)-(e), and 18(a)-(d).
Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial
Summary Judgment is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief is
dismissed.
This Ruling and Order constitutes the final order of the Court. No further order is
necessary to effectuate the Court's decision.
rVi-ha

IDCM

Digitally signed by David L Mower
DN CN = David L Mower C = US O = TrustID personal
certificate OU = DST TrustID Personal Certificate
Reason I am the author of this document
Date 2007 01 23 10 07 22-07 00'

David L. Mower
District Court Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171. Page -29Certificate of Notification
On

_, 2007, a copy of the above was sent to:
Thomas B. Brunker
Christopher D. Ballard
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6fll Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Grant W. P. Morrison
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Aric Cramer
CRAMER & CRAMER, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
90 East 100 South, Suite 201
St. George, Utah 84770

X

^Yj&AQA

r7\//^As^

Addendum D

JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GUILT PHASE OF THE TRIAL, Case number
941600213, Page-7If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that
witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what
weight you think it deserves.

14.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT
IS GUILTY?

The State of Utah is the one making the accusations in this case. It is responsible to
convince you that the crime was committed by the defendant.
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by
assuming it. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard against the danger of an
innocent person being unjustly punished.

15.

HOW CONVINCED SHOULD THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY?

Before you can give up your assumption the defendant is innocent, you must be strongly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. You must have no reasonable doubt about it.

16.

WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT?

A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation,
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as would
be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of all the
evidence, and must arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case.

mstg

Addendum E

INSTRUCTION NO. P5

The burden of proof described as "beyond a reasonable doubt" is used and referred to in
several places in these instructions. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to be
an absolute certainty. A reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense and not on
speculation or imagination. It is a doubt that is reasonable in view of all of the evidence. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy the mind and convince those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon such proof. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable men and women
would hold after consideration of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case.
You must keep in mind in assessing whether the State has met its burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the burden never shifts to the defendant.

Addendum F

May 21st fight between Payne and Blackmon, but before he murdered
Blackmon (VIII:4839).
110.

The letter is reproduced below.

The underlined

portions are what the jury saw during the guilt phase.
Dear Luther,
Thank you for the B-day card, very nice
surprise. I feel bad for not at least
writing you and yours but you were in my
thoughts that 30th day of March. At the time
I had just been sent to their one and only
other joint. CUCF PO Box 550 Gunnison, Utah
84634 - it's the same but only has up to a
level 3 - which is G.P. Level 2 is mini max
and Level 1 which is where I'm at is max.
I've only been here 2 1/2 months and have
picked up a case possibly. Had to introduce
the S.W.A.T. team "gooners" what a headbutt
to the face felt like. Ha. Ha. He got a
little nose bleed and a split lip - but so
did I once they got me down. . . . [Picture
of frowning face.] From what people tell me
around here I'll be getting charged. I guess
it's the first time someone has gotten one of
their swat fags. He was another sympathizer.
So you know how that goes. x'Can't be having
that." Ha. Ha.
This joint is built almost just like
Ely, but have 32 cells instead of 48 and have
solid windows on the bubble with no guns.
That can be seen anyways. So you know how I
like that. [Picture of smiling face.] They
don't come on the tier unless everyone is in
their cells. It's ran like transition use to
be. Upstairs is all lockdown single cell
which is where I'm at for the moment. I got
30 days D-D and a 35$ fine for the headbutt
not bad huh?? Downstairs gets 4 hours out 2
on the teir 2 on the yard a day. 8 out at a
time. And you have a cellie. They let us
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have water bags to workout with on the teir,
so its not to bad. Plus the porter and food
handler jobs are pay #'s. Right now the race
relations aren't to good. It seems a wood
Twhite inmates sometimes refer to each other
as woods (VIII:4838)1 decided to brake a
little nappy headed niggers jaw, so nappy's
cellie comes out on the tier who is like 250
and 6'4 he gets intercepted by my training
partner who is 5 inches shorter and 50 pounds
lighter than the monkey but is a gun slingen
motherfucker. When the nigger come out he
runs into a front kick to the gut and a fist
to the head - the monkey drops. Paul gets to
running a set to the back of the nigs head.
The pigs start spraying the fire hose - yeah
that's right a fire hose - no guns - but they
got a mean fire hose — ha-ha - so Paul slips
- the nig gets a few shots in but neither can
do anything - fucken firehose takes paint off
the walls - so they get up smiling saying
yeah that was alright - the nig and Paul turn
to lockdown and the nig fire's on him, so
Paul moves in a dry spot that the toad can't
get too under my cell by the stairs and tells
the toad come over here where its dry. The
nig is in his doorway and doesn't want
anymore. Paul plans to go in after the nig.
He yells up at me if the thing was out I said
yeah. He comes up to get the dag. Gets it
and starts back down the stairs. The toad is
getting his door shut while he's going down
the stairs - so the nigs start talking shit.
And there's only G-monkeys on the teir - but
only the two woods that got into it and
myself will do anything to these inferior
fucks. The rest are white slags and are
scared. The whites here have no racial pride
or even a small amount of loyalty. And it
makes me sick. The foods good and the pay
#'s everything else sucks . . . It'11 be
interesting to see how things go in about 20
days. Be all alone with 4 niggers "I hate it
when that happens"' Ha-ha. As for Jobber
[illegible] he called the house asking for a
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little help for some soap to wash his ass.
Guess they got him in Tracy on a teir with
only one other white and he's on pipe. Ha.
Ha. Sounds real fun there. Hopefully he'll
be able to get around some woods soon. I
know it has to be better for him then how it
was there, even though its fucked up for
awhile because you mis everyone and are used
to talking a certain way as in joking. Its
hard to relate to dudes that are in a total
different mind set. Thats the hardest part.
I only talk to the two woods I've already
mentioned about you guys and the shit we've
done. The loyalty, pride and looking out for
each other. And they have a hard time
understanding it because its not like that
here. The Mexicans and niggers do it but not
the whites. And when I run down some ideas
of mostly personal thoughts of white power
tactics they really get to triped and think
I'm wacked out of my mind. Ha. Ha. I'm
still trying to find my way home from that
water [picture of smiling face]. Speaking of
wacked out of water heads I better mention
Steve and Joey. I would say something to
Duremy but I already know his story spoon in
one hand and a donutt in the other. Sorry
fat fuck can't even say Hi. I would write
everyone their own letter but can't handle
all that shit. So one letter will have to
do. I do need to say something about
Graveyard. Hopefully soon. Willie - now
Jobber did run down the act of Treason that
he commited. It seems from what Big T says
is that this guy is down in the county jail
running his mouth throwing Big T's name and
survival trip in some bullshit about access
to certain things. Now I don't know if
anyone can get around him. But that shit has
to come to a stop. He had been sent back
before anything could be done.
Steve thanks for the card. Very nice touch.
Reminded me of when I used to grind on Lou and
bring my hands around to squeeze on his tittys.
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Ha. Ha. Then again his card reminded me of
watching you strip down for the yard. Nice Ass.
[Picture of a smiling face.] It sounds like you
guys are doing alright - when ever I come back
I'll have plenty of literaturer they almost let
anything in so thats how I'm spending much of my
celltime. At least trying to anyway. Lately it's
been plot, strategy of inflicting pain on a
nigger. I'm getting to old for this shit though.
My hairs falling out, my [illegible] mind is
going, and my body is beat down. [Picture of
frowning face]. Ha. Ha. Now that I'm not
there your probably the best looking wood out
of the bunch. But thats not saying much
considering H have no hair and the other H
have no teeth. [Picture of smiling face with
missing teeth.] Nice art work. I know I
don't write everyone I should but please give
my love to folks, Raymond, Italy, Pete, and
Darren. Also make sure Lou stays on the Iron
pile and not the water pile. I've been
drinking a little but havent fucked with the
other shit. I'll yell at Joey and shoot this
to ya.
Joey Well. Well are we lonely. [Picture
of frowning face.] I'm lonely too so don't
feel alone. You still have Pat, Darren and
foot, don't you? Tell 'em I said Hi. I
planned on writing you right back but have
been going through some changes myself. The
reason I have never called is because these
people have a very strange phone system I
have to have everyone approved. I have to
press in my back # then the phone # its all
done by machine they call first to make sure
its alright for me to call then its screened.
So that's why. Fuck that shit. Have they
still got you strained up or what? How about
getting sent back to Illinois what ever
happened to that?? Things on this end will
be getting live soon. Looks like I'll have
to show me a nappy headed monkey what some of
this white power is all about. They seem to
never learn. . . . Anyway you know I mis the
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shit out of everyone. One of these days I'll
find away to get a picture taken to send ya.
Maybe one like foot got in unit 7 with a dead
nigger on the floor in front of his cell and
foot eating a sandwich at his window. I
loved that one. It'll be hard to top that. .
. . Well its about time to jack my cock.
You guys be cool.
Love ya
(State's Exhibit 7 and 7-X (addendum B ) ; R. 1926-29 (addendum C ) .
See also
111.

II:3328-3352;VIII:4755-62, 4829-40.)
Defense counsel argued that the letter was not

relevant to any issue.

The trial court, however, agreed with the

State's contention that the letter was relevant to show that
Kell's motives for killing Blackmon included racial bias and
retaliating against Blackmon's "cheap shot" against Payne.
(11:3332-52; VIII:4757-62.)
112.

The State announced that it would introduce the

letter's redacted portions at the penalty phase, if the case
progressed that far (11:3352).
113.

Just before the letter was introduced, defense counsel

again argued that the trial court should exclude it.

However, he

agreed that he was satisfied with the redactions as done.

(VIII:

4757-58.)
114.

Kell testified at trial that his references to

"inflicting pain on a nigger" and showing "a nappy headed monkey
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Addendum G
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